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Abstract 
A criminal accused has a constitutional right to testify in his 
own defense. The right has an undisputed place alongside the 
most important “personal” rights, like the right to remain silent or 
the right to represent oneself. But in the 1990s, courts began to 
apply the ineffective-assistance test of Strickland v. Washington to 
evaluate claims by a defendant that his right to testify was 
abridged. In practice this nullifies the right. Moreover, the 
Strickland test is inapposite because it focuses on counsel and not 
the defendant’s right to testify. This Article proposes a new test to 
better secure and enforce the right, without subjecting courts to 
burdensome post-trial motions. 
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I. What Is the Constitutional Right to Testify? 
A. Origins and Meaning Today 
Anyone born since the invention of television knows that the 
“Fifth” allows you to keep silent in the face of a prosecution.1 But 
what about the converse right—the right, during that 
prosecution, to speak up, to give your side, to explain the 
mistakes of witnesses, to justify yourself? This is the right to 
testify, and like the right against compelled self-incrimination, it 
is a right that defendants decide whether to exercise in every 
criminal trial. Yet the accused’s right to choose to testify is often 
violated with impunity by lawyers. 
                                                                                                     
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
WHY STRICKLAND IS THE WRONG TEST 97 
A century and a half ago, American states followed the 
common law in disabling criminal defendants from testifying.2 
The notion behind these so-called “incompetency” statutes was 
that the self-serving testimony of a defendant was inherently 
untrustworthy (if not perjurious)3 and that incompetency statutes 
actually did the accused a favor—these laws protected the right 
against self-incrimination by relieving defendants of the negative 
inference that would be drawn if they were permitted to take the 
stand but refused.4 Yet according to Justice Brennan in Ferguson 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 570 (1961) (describing “the 
common-law rule that a person charged with a criminal offense is incompetent 
to testify on his own behalf at his trial”).  
 3. See JAMES FITZGERALD STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF ENGLAND 202 (1863) (“[I]t is not in human nature to speak the truth under 
such a pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner, and it is not a light 
thing to institute a system which would almost enforce perjury on every 
occasion.”). For a good state case on this subject, see State v. Wilcox, 175 S.E. 
122, 123 (N.C. 1934), in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed a 
trial judge who instructed that “‘the law presumes when a man is being tried for 
crime that he is naturally laboring under a temptation to testify to whatever he 
thinks may be necessary to clear himself of the charge.’” But see McVeigh v. 
United States, 78 U.S. 259, 267 (1870) (rejecting the rationale that a defendant 
should be disqualified from testifying because he has the incentive to testify 
falsely). The Court stated: 
If assailed there, he could defend there. The liability and the right are 
inseparable. A different result would be blot upon our jurisprudence 
and civilization. We cannot hesitate or doubt on the subject. It would 
be contrary to the first principle of the social compact and of the right 
administration of justice. 
Id. 
 4. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 571–76, 581–82 (describing the historical 
justifications for incompetency statutes). For this reason, the federal 
competency statute, first enacted in 1878, but provided in its present form in 
1948, reads as follows: 
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against 
the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts 
of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person 
charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure 
to make such request shall not create any presumption against him. 
18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006) (emphasis added); see also 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 579 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979) (examining 
competency laws in the United States). But see Benson v. United States, 146 
U.S. 325, 335–36 (1892) (discussing the erosion of competency laws in the 
United States); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1842) (describing 
exceptions to the common law incompetency rule); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *370 (“But as it is perfectly obvious that any witness who can 
throw any light upon the subject, should be allowed to state what he knows . . . , 
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v. Georgia,5 decided in 1961, experience made us wiser.6 Maine 
acted first, in 1864, enacting a general competency act for 
criminal defendants;7 by the end of the nineteenth century, every 
state but Georgia followed.8 “In a vast number of instances,” the 
Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. United States,9 in 1893, 
discussing the effects of the federal competency statute enacted 
fifteen years earlier, “the innocence of the defendant of the charge 
with which he was confronted has been established.”10  
Lawyers came to believe that the “shutting out of his sworn 
evidence could be positively hurtful to the accused, and that 
innocence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, by the opportunity of 
the accused to testify under oath.”11 The defendant, wrote the 
                                                                                                     
the stringent rules of our former law have been gradually relaxed by a series of 
modern statutes.”); William A. Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the 
Accused to Testify, 14 AM. L. REV. 753, 754 (1880) (attacking the validity of 
competency statutes). 
 5. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
 6. See id. at 580–81 (“Experience under the American competency 
statutes was to change the minds of many who had opposed them. It was seen 
that the shutting out of his sworn evidence could be positively hurtful to the 
accused . . . .”). 
 7. See Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 Me. Laws 214 (codified as 
amended at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1315 (2011)) (providing that defendants are 
competent witnesses in prosecutions for all crimes). Prior to enacting the 1864 
law, Maine enacted a competency law in 1859. See Act of Apr. 2, 1859, ch. 104, 
1859 Me. Laws 97 (providing that defendants are competent witnesses in 
prosecutions for certain minor crimes); see also Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 
(describing Maine’s adoption of competency statutes in 1859 and 1864 and 
similar actions by other states). 
 8. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 n.6 (listing the years in which states 
adopted competency acts). Congress enacted the federal analogue in March 
1878. See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006) (discussing federal and state competency 
legislation). 
 9. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893). 
 10. Id. at 66; see also Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)  
[T]he truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of 
all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have 
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and 
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court, 
rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the result 
that this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, accepted 
in this country and in Great Britain. 
 11. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 580–81 (1961). The Court made a 
similar statement in a case decided after the common law rule was abrogated: 
This rule, while affording great protection to the accused against 
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Court, “above all others may be in a position to meet the 
prosecution’s case.”12 Ferguson invalidated a Georgia statute that 
limited a defendant’s presentation to unsworn statements 
without questioning from counsel.13 The Court rested on the 
Assistance of Counsel Clause.14 It implied, but did not recognize, 
a right to testify under the Constitution.15  
That task was left to Rock v. Arkansas16 in 1987. “At this 
point in the development of our adversary system,” wrote Justice 
                                                                                                     
unfounded accusation, in many cases deprived him from explaining 
circumstances tending to create conclusions of his guilt which he 
could readily have removed if permitted to testify. To relieve him 
from this embarrassment the law was passed. In mercy to him, he is 
by the act in question permitted upon his request to testify in his own 
behalf in the case. In a vast number of instances the innocence of the 
defendant of the charge with which he was confronted has been 
established. 
Wilson, 149 U.S. at 65–66. 
 12. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582. 
 13. See id. at 596 (“We therefore hold that, in effectuating the provisions of 
§ 38-415, Georgia, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, could not, in 
the context of § 38-416, deny appellant the right to have his counsel question 
him to elicit his statement.”). 
 14. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”). 
 15. See id. at 572 n.1, 596 (crafting a narrow holding). Justice Clark, 
however, concurring, thought this was precisely what the Court was doing, as a 
matter of logical necessity, and that it was needlessly formulaic and foolish not 
to acknowledge this. See id. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring) (“Reaching the basic 
issue of incompetency . . . I do not hesitate to state that in my view § 38-416 
does not meet the requirements of due process and that, as an unsatisfactory 
remnant of an age gone by, it must fall as surely as does its palliative, § 38-
415.”). In Fowle v. United States, the Ninth Circuit relied on Justice Clark’s 
concurrence to find a constitutional right, apparently because all the judges 
agreed that such a right existed. See Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53 
(9th Cir. 1969) (“The Government says that if [the defendant] had wished to 
avoid all adverse inferences which might be drawn from his original silence in 
reliance on his constitutional rights, he should have sacrificed his constitutional 
right to testify in his own defense.” (emphasis added)). 
 16. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (“The right to testify on one’s own 
behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the Constitution. It 
is one of the rights that ‘[is] essential to due process of law in a fair adversary 
process.’” (citation omitted)). For a typical pre-Rock discussion of the right in a 
U.S. Court of Appeals, see Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1969), in 
which the Seventh Circuit stated: 
In the federal courts, the privilege of an accused to testify in his own 
defense is merely statutory, abrogating the common law rule of 
incompetence . . . . No case has been brought to our attention to 
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support petitioner’s contention that the Fourteenth Amendment 
accords a defendant in a state court a federal constitutional right to 
testify. To the contrary, the federal rule seems to be that the exercise 
of this right is subject to the determination of competent trial counsel 
and varies with the facts of each case. 
On the other hand, United States v. Von Roeder seemed to suggest that if a trial 
judge went too far in dissuading a willing defendant from testifying (say, by 
pointing out the dangers of cross-examination or perjury), this might violate a 
constitutional right or result in some other impropriety. See United States v. 
Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 1970) (analyzing a judge’s role in 
notifying a defendant of the possible effects of testifying at trial). Winters v. 
Cook stated that there exist certain “inherently personal fundamental right[s]” 
that “can be waived only by the defendant and not by his attorney,” which 
include the “right to testify personally.” Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th 
Cir. 1973). In United States v. Poe, the D.C. Circuit reversed a jury verdict, in 
accord with the ruling of the district court, which felt the trial was unfair 
because defense counsel gave legally incorrect advice about impeachment. See 
United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“The trial judge 
found that appellant was deprived of a fair trial because he was misinformed as 
to the consequences of taking the stand to deny the charges against him.”). But 
otherwise lawyers are “free to keep defendants from testifying whenever counsel 
see fit. Any suggestion to the contrary is chimerical.” Id. 
Courts of decades past were also in the habit of holding that if a defendant 
retained his choice of counsel, no error by that attorney, however grave, could 
constitute “a denial of due process chargeable to the state.” United States ex rel. 
Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 425–26 (3d Cir. 1953); see also Hudspeth v. 
McDonald, 120 F.2d 962, 967–68 (10th Cir. 1941) (stating that counsel was 
drunk for most of trial and finding no error).  
Yet, in the 1970s, a number of states held that the right to testify existed. 
See, e.g., State v. Noble, 514 P.2d 460, 461 (Ariz. 1973) (“It is well established 
that in criminal prosecutions an accused has the right to testify in his own 
behalf.” (citations omitted)); People v. Robles, 466 P.2d 710, 716 (Cal. 1970) (“We 
are satisfied that the right to testify in one’s own behalf is of such fundamental 
importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to 
the advice given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense 
before a jury.”). The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Hughes v. State, stated: 
[I]t is preferable that a defendant be permitted to testify if he so 
requests. The right to testify in one’s own behalf is often of vital 
importance in a trial. No defendant requesting to testify should be 
deprived of exercising that right and conveying his version of the 
facts to the court or jury, regardless of competent counsel’s advice to 
the contrary. 
Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1973). But it did not explicitly 
ground this in any constitution, state or federal, and found waiver of the right in 
any event. See id. at 1120 (“In the instant case, based on all of the testimony we 
conclude that Hughes knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify.”).  
Other states held that a criminal defendant had no constitutional right to 
testify on his own behalf. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 554 
(Mo. 1970) (referencing Ferguson and stating that “the assumption that the 
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Blackmun, “it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal 
case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his 
or her own defense.”17 The right had its “source” in three 
provisions.18 The Due Process Clause19 secures “‘an opportunity to 
be heard . . . a right to [a] day in court.’”20 The Compulsory 
Process Clause21 guarantees an accused’s right to call witnesses 
in his favor—and the “most important witness . . . in many 
criminal cases is the defendant himself.”22 Finally, the right to 
testify was seen as a “necessary corollary” of the Self-
                                                                                                     
right to testify is a constitutional right is erroneous” and that “the assumption 
ignores the history of the right”). 
 17. Rock, 483 U.S. at 49. One court, a few years earlier, observed that it 
seemed “surprising” that the Supreme Court had not yet explicitly ruled on this 
question, but noted that incompetency statutes had been abrogated in every 
jurisdiction in the country and that “as a practical matter a defendant’s right to 
testify is rarely questioned.” Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 920 (7th Cir. 1982). 
Alicea contains a rich discussion of the development of the right and its gradual 
recognition by one court after another. See generally id.; see also United States 
ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118–19 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing the 
right to testify in light of the “due process requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”).  
 18. See United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983) (providing 
an intelligent discussion of the history of the right and finding the right implicit 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment). Judge Cardamone, for the panel, found that 
because the right exists but is not enumerated, the Ninth Amendment was 
worth invoking. See id. (“That this unmentioned right is a constitutional one is 
further fortified by the rule of construction contained in the Ninth 
Amendment . . . .”); see also United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th 
Cir. 1969) (noting the maturation from incompetency to apparent constitutional 
right and stating that “in a federal court, it is not less than a statutory right, 
and it may not be denied a defendant if, being advised, he elects to exercise it”). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
 20. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) and 
citing Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring)). The 
standards of review under the Due Process Clause, whether the Clause appears 
in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, are the same.  
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor . . . .”). 
 22. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
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Incrimination Clause,23 because every defendant is “‘privileged to 
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.’”24 
Rock relied heavily on Faretta v. California,25 the case from 
1975 that established the constitutional right of self-
representation.26 Faretta read the Sixth Amendment27 to secure a 
“personal” right to represent oneself: “It is the accused, not 
counsel, who must be ‘informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation,’ who must be ‘confronted with the witnesses against 
him,’ and who must be accorded ‘compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor.’”28 It is the “defendant, and not his lawyer 
or the State, [who] will bear the personal consequences of a 
conviction.”29 And though it may be “undeniable” that most 
defendants could “better defend with counsel’s guidance than by 
their own unskilled efforts,” wrote Justice Stewart, “his choice 
must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is 
the lifeblood of the law.’”30 The right to self-representation was 
thus grounded in personal autonomy; the Court in Rock 
emphatically recognized the right to testify in that light. Rock not 
only drew on Faretta, but it explicitly stated: “Even more 
fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-
representation . . . is an accused’s right to present his own version 
of events in his own words.”31  
                                                                                                     
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 24. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–53 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 
(1971)). 
 25. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see also Rock, 483 U.S. at 
51–52 (discussing Faretta). 
 26. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807 (ruling that a state may not 
“constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer 
upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”). 
 28. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. 
 29. Id. at 834. 
 30. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). 
 31. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (emphasis added). The right 
was reaffirmed unanimously in United States v. Dunnigan. See United States v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (stating that the right to testify is “made 
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If the accused’s right to testify is unquestionably a 
fundamental constitutional right, grounded in personal 
autonomy, what is the remedy for violations of it? This Article 
considers the virtually uniform assessment by federal courts that 
the denial of the right to testify is a product of faulty lawyering 
and as such the remedy lies in Strickland v. Washington32 and its 
progeny—under which the defendant gets a retrial only if he can 
show that had he testified, there is a “reasonable probability” 
that the outcome of his trial would have been different.33 This 
Strickland “prejudice” standard has been nearly impossible for 
defendants to meet—resulting in a constitutional right without a 
remedy. 
B. The Right to Testify as Part of the Autonomy Line 
When the Supreme Court in Rock relied on Faretta, it placed 
the right to testify in what one might call the “free choice” line of 
cases.34 The principle behind these holdings is that certain rights 
are personal to the defendant—a matter of “dignity” and 
“autonomy” rather than “strategy” or “tactics”—which only the 
defendant, not his lawyer, can waive, and then only if knowingly 
and voluntarily.35 Faretta was one instance of such “[f]reedom of 
                                                                                                     
explicit by federal statute” and is “implicit in the Constitution”); see also Riggins 
v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is well 
established that the defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf, a right 
we have found essential to our adversary system.”). One circuit called Rock’s 
holding a “dictum” and assumed without deciding that the right to testify was 
“fundamental.” See Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(listing circuit court cases recognizing the right as fundamental).  
 32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 33. Id. at 694. 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th 
Cir. 2011)  
Although often framed as a right to testify, it is more properly framed 
as a right to choose whether to testify. The “choice” concept reflects 
the competing considerations that make up this right; while the Fifth 
Amendment gives the accused the right to remain silent, courts have 
recognized that the accused also has the absolute right to break his 
silence and to testify. 
(citations omitted). 
 35. See id. (“This right to choose is personal as well as fundamental, and 
the defendant must make this decision himself.”). 
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choice.”36 So, too, is the “‘profound’ choice” about whether to stand 
trial or plead guilty (Cooper v. Oklahoma)37 or the personal “choice 
of the petitioner” in deciding whether to appeal (Fay v. Noia).38 
Other cases in this line include Brookhart v. Janis39 (a lawyer 
cannot “overrid[e] his client’s desire” to exercise his “personal” 
right to confront witnesses);40 McKaskle v. Wiggins41 (right to self-
representation “affirm[s] the dignity and autonomy of the accused” 
and can be undermined by intrusive standby counsel);42 Adams v. 
United States43 (defendant can insist on bench trial as matter of 
“free choice by a self-determining individual,” which to deny is to 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.45 (1975) (citing the 
constitutional protection afforded to a defendant’s free choice to testify in a 
criminal proceeding). For a good illustration of how the right is grounded in 
autonomy and not trial result, see Johnstone v. Kelly, 812 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 
1987). See also infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. 
 37. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996) (citing Godinez v. Moran, 
509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993)). 
 38. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439–40 (1963); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 92 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that in Fay the “critical 
procedural decision—whether to take a criminal appeal—was entrusted to a 
convicted defendant” and that the case’s touchstone was “the exercise of volition 
by the defendant himself with respect to his own federal constitutional rights”); 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that counsel must 
support the defendant’s appeal to the best of counsel’s ability). 
The Supreme Court said as recently as 1983 that “[t]here is, of course, no 
constitutional right of appeal,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), though 
it is hard to imagine that if such a question arose today, in a case in which a 
substantial liberty or property interest was at stake, a majority of the Court 
would care to say so again. For an illuminating discussion of this proposition, 
see Shifflett v. Virginia, 447 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1971). The issue was the extent to 
which lawyers must explain the rights of appeal to a client in order to enable the 
client to make an informed decision about whether to exercise the right. See id. 
at 53–54 (“To assure that the decision to take or forego an appeal would depend 
only on the defendant’s own informed choice, we required in Nelson that he be 
given complete information, by his lawyer or by the court, about his right to 
appeal . . . .”). 
 39. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).  
 40. Id. at 7. The Court seemed to be relying on the defendant’s rights to 
cross-examine and confront witnesses against him, opportunities that a guilty 
plea (or “prima facie” trial—apparently an Ohio state procedure of convenience) 
would of course foreclose. 
 41. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
 42. Id. at 176–77. 
 43. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
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“imprison a man in his privilege and call it the Constitution”);44 
and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez45 (defendant usually has a 
“right to counsel of choice”).46 These defendant-only decisions are 
not among the multitude entrusted to counsel—even if the 
accused’s choice is inimical to his best interests in view of the 
bench and bar.47 Thus the Tenth Circuit wrote that a lawyer 
“lacks authority to prevent a defendant from testifying in his own 
defense, even when doing so is suicidal trial strategy.”48 “If a 
defendant insists on testifying,” said the Seventh Circuit, 
“however irrational that insistence might be from a tactical 
viewpoint, counsel must accede.”49 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 280–81; see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) 
(affirming a defendant’s choice to waive his right to a trial by jury composed of 
twelve members). 
 45. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 46. See id. at 147 (“The right to select counsel of one’s choice, by contrast, 
has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair 
trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional 
guarantee.”). But see infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing 
Gonzalez-Lopez and Wheat).  
 47. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)  
It is also recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority to 
make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to 
whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, 
or take an appeal, . . . . [though an] indigent defendant [does not] 
ha[ve][] a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press 
nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of 
professional judgment, decides not to present those points. 
See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“And although he may 
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be 
honored . . . .”). 
 48. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004); see also United 
States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (“‘The wisdom or 
unwisdom of the defendant’s choice does not diminish his right to make it.’” 
(quoting Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1079 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., 
dissenting))); Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261 (7th Cir. 1988) (“If a 
defendant insists on testifying, no matter how unwise such a decision, the 
attorney must comply with the request.”). Such a “suicidal” strategy may have 
been undertaken in People v. Robles, where it appeared that the defendant was 
perfectly indifferent to the success of his defense. See People v. Robles, 466 P.2d 
710, 716–18 (Cal. 1970) (describing how the defendant insisted on testifying in 
his own defense, was impeached by prior convictions, made damaging 
admissions, engaged in offensive outbursts, and told jurors that they were “just 
a bunch of fools”). 
 49. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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II. Why Strickland Should Not Be Applied in Right-to-Testify 
Cases 
A. The Results of Applying Strickland to Right-to-Testify Claims 
Allegations by a defendant that his right to testify was 
coercively abridged are common. The culprit is usually a lawyer 
who said something like, “I make all decisions concerning this 
case and I say you’re not going to testify.”50 At other times the 
lawyer is alleged to have told the accused that he would call him 
and then rested the case before doing so.51 Almost all such 
allegations are brought on habeas petitions under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act52—with its 
forbidding “doubly deferential” standards53—because discussions 
between counsel and client are usually outside the record. They 
occur in whispers at counsel table, in prison chambers, hallways, 
or lawyers’ offices.54 
                                                                                                     
 50. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 51. See United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 996–97 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(stating that defendant by all appearances planned to testify, fell ill on the day 
he was to do so, and was persuaded by counsel not to testify). The defendant 
argued that counsel might have sought a continuance. Id. at 997. 
 52. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.). 
 53. See Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(stating that “as a federal habeas court we are not applying Strickland de novo, 
but rather through the additional prism of AEDPA deference” and determining 
that “under this doubly deferential standard, ‘[t]he pivotal question is whether 
the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable’” 
(citations omitted)). For the phrase “doubly deferential,” see Knowles v. 
Mirzavance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 
5–6 (2003) (per curiam)).  
 54. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (“When an 
ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and 
the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of 
litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for 
this purpose.”); see also Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 476 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Lawyers who raise ineffective-assistance claims 
on direct appeal do their clients a grave disservice, because the inevitable loss 
will prevent the accused from raising the same claim later, when factual 
development would permit accurate resolution.”). The Supreme Court in 
Massaro adopted this reasoning. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504 (“In light of the 
way our system has developed, in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is 
preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.”). 
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Federal courts are loath to entertain these claims, usually 
because the facts are that the defendant was advised to keep 
quiet, wisely heeded his lawyers, and now regrets it. But courts 
do look askance at instances in which a lawyer really seems to 
have silenced a defendant against his will. The inquiry is 
conducted under Strickland v. Washington, which states the test 
for whether a lawyer was constitutionally adequate under the 
Assistance of Counsel Clause.55 Why Strickland? The most-cited 
case applying a Strickland analysis to deprivation of the right to 
testify is United States v. Teague,56 an Eleventh Circuit case from 
1992.57 But that circuit (and the Fifth Circuit, from which it was 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (stating that a 
convicted defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and 
that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant in some way). 
 56. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
 57. See id. at 1534 (“[W]e believe the appropriate vehicle for claims that the 
defendant’s right to testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland . . . .”). As it happened, the 
original panel that heard the case applied harmless-error review. See United 
States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 757 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 899 
(11th Cir. 1991) (“Thus, the court concluded, because Teague’s testimony would 
have been largely duplicative, any error in not allowing him to testify was 
harmless.”). Before Teague, but after Strickland, that court reviewed such 
claims under Chapman v. California as a sort of independent constitutional 
violation of the right to testify, independent of any ineffectiveness claim. See 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding “that before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also Nichols v. 
Butler, 917 F.2d 518, 521 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 932 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 
1991) (finding that a Strickland analysis was unnecessary because “such 
conduct by defense counsel amounts to a violation of the right to testify 
regardless of whether it also amount to ineffectiveness of counsel”). Because this 
case was vacated after an en banc poll and redecided after Teague, Strickland 
now applied. See Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1552–54 (11th Cir. 1992) (en 
banc) (applying Strickland). 
The earliest case we find to connect Strickland and the right to testify is 
United States v. Curtis, decided a few months after Strickland. See United 
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1074–76 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing the Strickland 
presumption that a decision not to testify might be considered sound trial 
strategy). The first post-Rock case we find specifically applying Strickland to a 
right-to-testify claim is Isom v. Lockhart. See Isom v. Lockhart, 847 F.2d 484, 
486 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying the two-prong Strickland test, which requires 
objectively unreasonable representation by counsel and a reasonable likelihood 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for this 
representation). It was a habeas case in which the court applied Strickland 
without much discussion. Id. The other claim involved the lawyer’s failure to 
dismiss the venire after three veniremen—asked by the defendant’s attorney 
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split) skirmished for years over how, judicially, to enforce the 
right to testify, reaching a high point in Wright v. Estelle,58 a 
brilliant en banc battle royale in 1978, and as eloquent a 
discussion on the subject as can be found in the Federal Reporter. 
In that case Archie Wright, on trial for murder and robbery, 
was told by his lawyer that if he, Wright, testified, the lawyer 
would withdraw; the attorney felt Wright’s version did not match 
up with other accounts and that if the jury thought he, Wright, 
was lying, he would get a death sentence.59 The circuit judges 
split into two camps and put the case strikingly, worth relating at 
length because they so capably capture the considerations 
surrounding protection of the right to testify. One group, led by 
Judge Thornberry, acknowledged that a defendant of course has 
                                                                                                     
whether they understood that her client had the right both to testify and to 
refuse to do so—said things like “I understand the law but I think if I was in it I 
would want to testify . . . . I think I would be man enough to want to tell my 
side.” Id. at 485. This latter claim is a classic Strickland question; perhaps the 
court simply did not consider whether a different standard might apply to the 
former claim.  
The Ninth Circuit appears to have been second: in United States v. Hood, it 
applied Strickland because the “right to testify certainly may implicate the sixth 
amendment”—in a case in which the defendant argued that bad advice 
dissuaded him from testifying to his advantage. United States v. Hood, No. 88-
4046, 1989 WL 102017, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1989). Galowski v. Murphy 
provides another early statement, but it appears that the petitioner also tried to 
assert the claim as an “independent constitutional violation,” but the claim was 
barred for not having been asserted before. Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 
636 n.12 (7th Cir. 1989). 
The district court in United States v. Butts, an impassioned decision given 
shortly before Rock, rejected both parties’ argument that right-to-testify claims 
were Strickland questions. See United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145, 1148 
(D. Me. 1986) (“The Court does not find Strickland applicable in this case.”). 
Judge Carter said this was because the attorney’s conduct was “troublesome not 
just for its possible impact on the reliability of the verdict, i.e., for its Sixth 
Amendment implications,” but because of concerns for a fair trial under the 
Fifth Amendment and the right to meet and deny accusations against a 
defendant under the Sixth Amendment. Id. He also thought “a defendant’s right 
to testify in a criminal proceeding against him [is] so basic to a fair trial that its 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error, which is in essence the 
inquiry required to be made by the second prong—prejudice to the defense—of 
Strickland.” Id. 
 58. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 
 59. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 971, 972–74 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’d en banc, 
572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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the right to reject or accept a lawyer to conduct his defense.60 But 
once the defendant chooses to entrust his life and liberty to a 
person versed in the law, that delegation includes the decision as 
to whether the client testifies: 
Trial attorneys are professional artisans working in a highly 
competitive arena that requires all the skills which education, 
training, and experience have given them. Criminal 
defendants are entitled to no less. A defendant has a right to 
necessary surgery, but he does not have the right to require 
the surgeon to perform an operation contrary to accepted 
medical practice. If, despite his counsel’s advice, a defendant 
continues to believe that his testimony is more important than 
the continued services of an attorney who insists he should not 
take the stand, the conflict must be resolved by the court. Only 
in this way may the right to testify be reconciled with the right 
to effective assistance of counsel . . . . 
While Faretta allows a defendant to have a fool for a 
client . . . , there is nothing in its logic that commands that the 
defendant may also have a fool for an attorney . . . . [T]he 
decision whether to testify is properly allocated to the 
defendant’s attorney and not to the defendant. An attorney is 
not necessarily ineffective if he determines not to allow his 
client to testify, even though he should give great deference to 
a defendant’s desire to testify[;] however, we are here 
concerned with constitutional requirements and there is no 
constitutional requirement that a court-appointed attorney 
must walk his client to the electric chair.61 
Judge Godbold answered for himself and two others, relying on a 
personal autonomy argument: 
The rationale of Faretta v. California and its precursors, 
relating to the right of the accused to defend himself, leads to 
the conclusion that the right to testify is a fundamental right 
reserved to the defendant for decision. In making the choice on 
whether to testify, just as the choice on whether to represent 
himself, the defendant elects whether to become an active 
participant in the proceeding that affects his life and liberty 
and to inject his own action, voice and personality into the 
process to the extent the system permits. 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Wright, 572 F.2d at 1073 (Thornberry, J., specially concurring) 
(“The defendant, of course, has the authority in the first instance to accept or 
reject court-appointed representation.”). 
 61. Id. at 1073–74 (citation omitted). 
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In the narrow world of the courtroom the defendant may have 
faith, even if mistaken, in his own ability to persuasively tell 
his story to the jury. He may desire to face his accusers and 
the jury, state his position, and submit to examination. His 
interest may extend beyond content to the hope that he will 
have a personalized impact upon the jury or gain advantage 
from having taken the stand rather than to seek the shelter of 
the Fifth Amendment. Or, without regard to impact upon the 
jury, his desire to tell “his side” in a public forum may be of 
overriding importance to him. Indeed, in some circumstances 
the defendant, without regard to the risks, may wish to speak 
from the stand, over the head of judge and jury, to a larger 
audience. It is not for his attorney to muzzle him. 
. . . . 
Indeed, our history is replete with trials of defendants who 
faced the court, determined to speak before their fate was 
pronounced: Socrates, who condemned Athenian justice 
heedless of the cup of hemlock; Charles I, who challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Cromwellians over a divine monarch; Susan 
B. Anthony, who argued for the female ballot; and Sacco and 
Vanzetti, who revealed the flaws of their tribunal. To deny a 
defendant the right to tell his story from the stand 
dehumanizes the administration of justice. I cannot accept a 
decision that allows a jury to condemn to death or 
imprisonment a defendant who desires to speak, without ever 
having heard the sound of his voice.62 
Fourteen years later, in 1992, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en 
banc in Teague, revisited the question. Without any considered 
discussion, the court simply settled on this:  
Because it is primarily the responsibility of defense counsel to 
advise the defendant of his right to testify and thereby to 
ensure that the right is protected, we believe that the 
appropriate vehicle for claims that the defendant’s right to 
testify was violated by defense counsel is a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Strickland . . . .63  
No authority was cited. Rock, decided five years earlier, certainly 
never invoked the Assistance of Counsel Clause in support of the 
right to testify.64 Nonetheless, other circuits, largely relying on 
                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 1077–78 (Godbold, J., dissenting). 
 63. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (en 
banc). 
 64. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1987) (indicating that the 
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Teague, were persuaded to adopt Strickland because the choice of 
whether to testify is usually made in consultation with the 
attorney.65 Today every circuit uses Strickland to evaluate right-
to-testify claims, which can range from allegations of a mere 
                                                                                                     
right to testify on one’s own behalf in a criminal trial is grounded in the 
Constitution’s Compulsory Process Cause, Due Process Clause, and Self-
Incrimination Clause). 
 65. See United States v. Espinoza, 392 F. App’x 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“Because the choice whether to testify is often made in consultation with an 
attorney, violations of the right to testify are ‘best treated’ as ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.” (citing Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1170 
(10th Cir. 2004))). The panel in United States v. Tavares seemed to apply a sort 
of heightened Strickland test:  
A more reasonable approach, and one in keeping with Strickland’s 
two-part test, is to continue to assign special significance to the 
defendant’s precluded right to testify and at the same time to inquire 
whether it is reasonably probable that the defendant’s testimony 
would have changed the outcome of the trial in his favor. 
United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
Yet as late as 1998, the Eighth Circuit was willing to assert that, when the 
error is defense counsel’s, “it is unclear if harmless error analysis applies to the 
denial of a defendant’s right to testify.” Frey v. Schuetzle, 151 F.3d 893, 898 n.3 
(8th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 248 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1998) (emphasizing that it is a matter of judicial discretion to determine 
whether a harmless-error analysis should be applied to actions committed by 
the district court). These musings have been abandoned. See infra note 66. 
In a few published (and still cited) opinions, the Seventh Circuit applied a 
harmless-error test when the allegation of abridgment of the right was directed 
at defense counsel. In Ortega v. O’Leary, the panel wrote that it “has previously 
ruled that the Chapman standard applies when a petitioner has been denied the 
right to testify.” Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing 
Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)). Curiously, 
years later, in Ward v. Sternes, that Circuit again applied Chapman’s harmless-
error standard (as had the district court under review) and found that: 
[H]ad the jury been given the opportunity to observe Ward testify 
while sober yet still exhibiting these signs of his mental deficiencies, 
it is conceivable that the jury would have given more credence to the 
expert psychiatric testimony and particularly Dr. Traugott’s opinion 
that Ward’s brain injury alone, regardless of his intoxication, would 
have rendered him incapable of conforming his actions to the law. On 
this close question, the inability to hear Ward testify was not 
harmless error. 
Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 708 (7th Cir. 2003). But the discussion in 
Alexander v. United States suggested that in most cases the circuit applies 
Strickland. See Alexander v. United States, 219 F. App’x 520, 523 (7th Cir. 
2007) (applying Strickland).  
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failure to adequately inform a defendant about his right, all the 
way to instances of genuine coercion that prevent its exercise.66  
What has been the result? Strickland requires a petitioner 
(usually proceeding pro se) to prove deficient performance by the 
lawyer and prejudice to the client.67 The first prong usually 
involves a dispute over what the defendant told his lawyer about 
his desire to testify. Far more important is the “prejudice” prong. 
It is here that the right is rendered a nullity. Under Strickland’s 
second prong, the petitioner must show a “reasonable probability 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 57–59 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(applying Strickland to a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
relating to counsel’s alleged failure to inform defendant of his right to testify at 
trial); Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) 
We conclude that the decision whether a defendant should testify at 
trial is for the defendant to make, that trial counsel’s duty of effective 
assistance includes the responsibility to advise the defendant 
concerning the exercise of this constitutional right, and that the two-
part test established in Strickland v. Washington, should be used to 
assess a defendant’s claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by preventing him from testifying or at least failing to 
advise him concerning his right to testify. 
See also Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[E]very 
authority we are aware of that has addressed the matter of counsel’s failure to 
advise a client of the right to testify has done so under Strickland’s two-prong 
framework.”); Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Sayre 
contends only that his attorney interfered with his right to testify, not that the 
state trial court (or prosecutor) did so.”); Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 882 
(4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] criminal defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective because trial counsel failed to inform him of his right 
to testify or because trial counsel forced him to testify must satisfy the two-
prong test established in Strickland v. Washington . . . .”). In United States v. 
Brown, the Fifth Circuit recently held that “[t]he appropriate vehicle for such 
claims is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Brown, 
217 F.3d 247, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 
Hubbard, 638 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Strickland); Matylinsky v. 
Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Strickland standard is 
applicable when a petitioner claims his attorney was ineffective by denying him 
his constitutional right to testify.”); Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1170 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (“We agree [with other circuits] that Mr. Cannon’s claim is best 
treated as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and analyze it as such.”); 
Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 983 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(applying Strickland); United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 
2000) (same); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(citing Strickland). 
 67. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (“A 
convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to 
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.”). 
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that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”68 When the claim is 
deprivation of the right to testify truthfully, the defendant loses 
almost every time. The court usually finds some or all of the 
following: the accused would not have been found credible;69 his 
testimony would have been cumulative;70 he would have been 
exposed to impeachment with prior convictions;71 the evidence 
                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 694. 
 69. See, e.g., Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1130 (11th Cir. 
2012) (finding that petitioner, a first-degree murderer of an elderly lady, “would 
not have been credible”); Alexander v. United States, 219 F. App’x 520, 524 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“It is not reasonably likely that Alexander’s testimony, given his 
diminished credibility as a convicted felon, would have swayed the jury’s verdict 
in any way.”); United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The 
difficulty is that a denial by Mullins from the stand would come at a high price. 
It would juxtapose a police officer whose account is supported by Mullins’s 
signed statement with a felon with a large incentive to lie.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Morris, 677 F.3d at 1130 (finding that the defendant “would 
not have been credible in reasserting his innocence and that his proposed 
testimony would have been cumulative,” although the record was “unclear” 
about whether counsel told him of his right to testify); Washington v. Kemna, 16 
F. App’x 528, 530 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Washington’s testimony at trial would have 
merely reiterated the alibi defense already provided through the trial testimony 
of his mother, Patricia Washington.”); United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 
998 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (assuming that defendant would have testified “absent his 
counsel’s actions” but finding that his “proposed testimony would have been 
largely cumulative and, to the extent it was not cumulative, largely peripheral”). 
 71. See, e.g., Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000) 
Moreover, [attorney] Egger had very good reason for suggesting that 
Dows not testify. Dows had three prior convictions for robbery and 
assault, which, in all likelihood, would have been admitted to 
impeach Dows on the stand if he had testified . . . . As noted with 
some irony by the trial court, if Egger had allowed Dows to testify 
under this scenario, that would be definite proof he was suffering 
from Alzheimer’s disease. Dows cannot prove deficient performance or 
prejudice based upon his failure to testify at trial. 
See also Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Medley’s 
lawyer recommended that Medley not testify because he would have been 
impeached by his prior convictions and statements he made during a lengthy 
interview he gave police, which apparently were inconsistent with what Medley 
intended to testify.”); Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 983 (7th Cir. 
2002) (en banc) (“First, Rodriguez cannot show that his counsel’s advice 
concerning the impeachment value of his prior crime was unreasonable.”). 
For an example of the analysis under the old, pre-Rock state of the law, see 
Hudgins v. United States, 340 F.2d 391, 396 (3d Cir. 1965), in which the Third 
Circuit stated: 
Any statements made by him in his testimony at the hearing upon 
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against him was “overwhelming”;72 or his testimony was weak 
and would not have helped.73 Often a court simply passes over the 
                                                                                                     
the motion, had he been permitted to testify, could have been used 
against him by way of impeachment at the trial. We regard the 
refusal of his counsel, if in fact there was a refusal, to permit him to 
testify at the hearing on the motion as an example of good trial tactics 
by an attorney versed in the criminal law. 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Ailemen, 473 F. App’x 754, 755 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“[E]ven if we assume that Ailemen was prevented from testifying by his 
attorneys, he has failed to show that he could have overcome the overwhelming 
evidence against him.”); Battle v. Sirmons, 304 F. App’x 688, 693 (10th Cir. 
2008) (“To counter the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented against 
him, Battle argues that his testimony would have explained away all of the 
state’s evidence. Even if we entertain Battle’s arguments presented in brief, 
which reflect the 20/20 wisdom of hindsight, we cannot find prejudice.”); 
Franklin v. United States, 227 F. App’x 856, 857 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Franklin’s 
proposed testimony . . . would not have been credible nor would it have refuted 
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Franklin failed to establish prejudice 
because there was no reasonable probability that his self-serving testimony 
would have convinced the jury to reject the evidence and acquit him.”); Donato 
v. United States, No. 98-2991, 208 F.3d 202, at *1–2 (2d Cir. 2000) 
Donato wrote the court a letter dated June 16, 1998 stating that “the 
defendant never informed defense counsel, that the defendant did not 
wish to testify” and that “this decision not to testify was made by 
counsel Cohen, and the defendant did not have any decision input on 
this matter.” In its decision, the district court was apparently 
unaware that Donato had sent this letter, as it found that “Donato 
has not answered” the court’s request for his response to Cohen’s 
letter. Therefore, when the district judge made a finding of fact that 
Cohen’s account was credible, he may have assumed that the issue 
was uncontested. Nonetheless, even assuming that there was a 
deficient performance by counsel denying Donato his right to testify, 
unless Donato’s potential testimony could have established a defense, 
he cannot demonstrate prejudice. 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the defendant’s “ineffective assistance of counsel claim [was] 
without merit”). The court, considering Strickland deficiency, concluded without 
discussing the allegation that “counsel interfered with his right to testify,” that 
the defendant had “not convincingly argued that his testimony would have 
assisted him at either the pretrial hearing or at trial[,]” and that the defendant 
did “not even address the viability of the countervailing tactical reasons that his 
counsel might have had for declining to call him to the stand.” Id. at 598. This, 
in our view, is not supposed to be part of the test. 
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question of lawyer deficiency—as Strickland allows it to do74—to 
reach a finding of no prejudice.75  
A typical case might explain that even though counsel should 
not have rested after defendant expressed a wish to “contribute[] 
something new and substantive” to his defense, the evidence of 
his guilt in “possessing the 8,440 doses of LSD found in the record 
album in his house was so strong that there is no reasonable 
probability that his testimony would have altered the outcome of 
the trial.”76 Dozens of cases have sentences like: “We need not 
address whether Lee’s counsel was deficient for failing to call Lee 
to testify, because Lee cannot show that he was prejudiced under 
Strickland,”77 or “[E]ven if Liriano could establish that her 
counsel’s conduct was deficient, she has made no showing of 
prejudice.”78 Frequently it is left entirely mysterious what the 
actual allegations against the attorney were.79 Was there 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“In particular, 
a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies.”). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Ailemen, 473 F. App’x 754, 756 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“Further, ‘[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.’” 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)); United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 
997 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Although it does not expressly concede that Werdig’s 
performance was inadequate, the government does not contest Tavares’s 
arguments on this point. The only question before us is whether Tavares was 
prejudiced by his counsel’s actions—specifically by Werdig’s failure to ensure 
that Tavares had an opportunity to testify.”). 
 76. Tavares, 100 F.3d at 999. 
 77. Lee v. Culliver, 300 F. App’x 689, 690 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 78. United States v. Betancur, 84 F. App’x 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2004). See, e.g., 
Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We need not remand for a 
finding on this point because, even if Brown’s conclusory allegation raised an 
issue on the performance prong of Strickland . . . Brown cannot satisfy the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 335 F. App’x 949, 951–52 (11th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (containing no discussion of what happened); Battle v. 
Sirnons, 304 F. App’x 688, 693 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating “[i]f Battle were 
prevented from testifying” but containing no discussion of what happened). It 
may be that no hearing or inquiry into the matter was conducted at the district 
court level and that these panels simply did not have any specifics in their 
record. 
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coercion?80 A threat by the lawyer to withdraw if the client 
testified?81 An unfulfilled promise to call the defendant?82 
But under Strickland’s prejudice prong, it does not matter 
that the accused was left in ignorance of his rights, misled, lied 
to, or ignored.83 It does not even matter that a defendant was 
coerced, threatened, cajoled, or otherwise improperly influenced 
into relinquishing his right.84 Such acts go to the deficient-
performance prong; they are irrelevant to whether the accused 
suffered prejudice. Thus, in United States v. Mullins,85 a lawyer 
admitted that her client “repeatedly requested to testify, and that 
she ‘prevented’ him from doing so against his wishes.”86 Yet the 
court found no prejudice because the defendant’s testimony 
“would [have] come at high price” by opening him to 
impeachment and because it was doubtful that a felon would be 
credited over an officer.87 In Gross v. Knight,88 a lawyer testified, 
“I’m sure I just told him it wasn’t going to happen . . . . [It was] a 
kind of discussion I’d have with my 9-year-old about whether he’s 
going to clean his room.”89 The court could not descry a “better 
                                                                                                     
 80. See, e.g., Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[T]o 
coerce his client into remaining silent by threatening to abandon him mid-trial 
goes beyond the bounds of proper advocacy.”). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 492 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that defense “counsel moved to withdraw shortly after the prosecution 
rested its case” and that the trial court assumed that counsel “made the motion 
because she discovered that [the defendant] intended to commit perjury”). 
 82. This was the specific allegation in United States v. Burnell, but what 
actually happened between the client and his attorney was left undetermined 
because the court found that no prejudice was demonstrated. See United States 
v. Burnell, No. 11-8100, 2012 WL 1664124, at *1 (10th Cir. May 14, 2012) 
(“Because Mr. Burnell has not made an adequate showing of prejudice, the 
district court has not abused its discretion in denying him an evidentiary 
hearing on his ineffectiveness claim concerning the right to testify.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Foster v. Delo, 39 F.3d 873, 883–84 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating 
that trial lawyers admitted that they could not recall whether they informed the 
defendant that he was permitted to testify at the penalty phase of his capital 
trial). 
 84. See, e.g., Nichols, 953 F.2d at 1553 (stating that the defendant’s 
attorney threatened to abandon him mid-trial). 
 85. United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 86. Id. at 455. 
 87. Id. at 456.  
 88. Gross v. Knight, 560 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 89. Id. at 670. 
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than negligible chance his testimony [as to remorse] would have 
resulted in a different outcome,” largely because it would only 
have added to a “vast amount of [other] mitigating evidence.”90  
Defendants prevail on ineffectiveness claims only in those 
exceedingly rare instances where the government’s case is so 
weak that the accused’s failure to testify is found actually to 
render a result unreliable.91 Nichols v. Butler92 was a “very close” 
robbery case in which the only evidence against the defendant 
was an eyewitness who glimpsed him briefly.93 The court found 
that permitting the defendant to present his account “in his own 
words” would have allowed the jury to “weigh his credibility” 
against that of the witness.94 In Cannon v. Mullin,95 the “power of 
a face-to-face appeal” might have convinced a jury that what the 
prosecutor called murder was in fact manslaughter in self-
defense.96 And in Canaan v. McBride,97 an attorney testified that 
it never “crossed [his] mind” to call his capital defendant during 
the penalty phase even though the testimony “would have been 
the only mitigating evidence the jury heard” and “may have 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 673. 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Lore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 729, 739–40 (D.N.J. 
1998) (finding prejudice in counsel’s refusal to permit defendant to testify, 
reasoning that the evidence against defendant was weaker than against 
codefendants and that defendant could have provided a noncriminal explanation 
for the government’s alleged extortionate activity); Campos v. United States, 
930 F. Supp. 787, 793–94 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding prejudice in lawyer’s refusal 
to allow defendant to testify, noting that testimony could have made a difference 
because the government’s case turned almost entirely on the testimony of a DEA 
agent); see also United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1178–79 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(relying on the notion that the accused, with his knowledge of facts, his 
testimony, and his demeanor, is of “prime importance” in a trial in which the 
“very point” is to determine guilt); United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 971 (9th 
Cir. 1971) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (“The facial expressions of a witness may 
convey much more to the trier of the facts than do the spoken words.”). 
 92. Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1150 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 93. See id. at 1551 (“A store employee testified that he glanced at this man 
for ‘not even a second.’”). 
 94. Id. at 1554. 
 95. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 96. See id. at 1152 (finding that live testimony from the defendant may 
have been more persuasive to the jury than the recorded statement by the 
defendant that was offered at trial). 
 97. Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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persuaded the jury to be lenient.”98 To summarize the state of the 
law, one might say one of two things. At best, defendants have a 
right with a very unpromising remedy; at worst, the right to 
testify does not exist unless its denial renders the trial unfair. 
Defense counsel causes most of these errors. But a trial 
court, a statute, or a prosecutor can also infringe the right. Rock 
itself involved an Arkansas rule of evidence that excluded 
hypnotically refreshed testimony.99 In such circumstances 
Strickland makes absolutely no sense. 
If a source other than defense counsel causes a violation of 
the right to testify, reviewing courts apply a harmless-error 
standard,100 or if the defendant failed to object, plain-error 
review.101 Trial-court errors include instances where, for instance, 
a judge failed to correct an obvious misapprehension on the part 
of a pro se defendant who did not know that he had a right to 
testify in narrative form.102 Another court erred when it failed to 
make inquiry after an attorney stated that his client wished to 
remain silent, yet the defendant interrupted, calling the lawyer a 
liar and insisting, “I want to take the stand.”103 A court also erred 
when it circumscribed a defendant’s planned testimony on motive 
by ruling, incorrectly, that aspects of it were irrelevant.104 
                                                                                                     
 98. Id. at 385–87. 
 99. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54–56 (1987) (describing the rule of 
evidence that affected defendant’s right to testify and providing a balancing test 
to be applied in cases of conflict between a statute and the right to testify).  
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 248, 248 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1998) (reviewing for harmlessness where the district court discouraged the 
defendant from testifying by advising him “if my son were on trial here, I would 
tell him to follow his lawyer’s advice[,]” and “[i]f I were on trial, I would follow 
my lawyer’s advice”). 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Lechner, 341 F. App’x 443, 447–48 (10th Cir. 
2009) (using a plain-error standard to review the appropriateness of the trial 
court telling a defendant who did not object at trial “your failure to testify will 
not have any impact on my decision making whatsoever”). 
 102. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“By not informing Ly that he could testify in narrative form, the district 
court denied his right to choose whether to testify ‘knowingly and 
intelligently.’”). 
 103. See Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 259–60, 259 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(describing the defendant’s attempts to testify and the trial judge’s failure to 
permit the testimony). 
 104. See United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 194–95 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding 
that the court’s failure to provide the defendant with an “opportunity to explain 
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Finally, a common court error arises when a judge, concerned 
with perjury, discourages a defendant who indicated interest in 
testifying.105 A United States Attorney could infringe the right by 
engaging in misconduct like threatening a defendant with a 
perjury indictment without any basis to suspect an intent to 
lie.106 These cases show that using a Strickland analysis in 
evaluating a deprivation of the right to testify is misguided—the 
right denied is not the right to effective counsel, but the right to 
testify. And that right should have the same remedy as the denial 
of other constitutional rights. 
                                                                                                     
in his own words” a theory of motive inconsistent with that offered by the 
government “infringed upon his constitutional right to put forth a complete 
defense”). In Leo, the error did not provide the basis for a new trial because it 
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 195. For a case in which the 
defendant’s testimony was found irrelevant, see United States v. Fazio, 487 F.3d 
646, 656–57 (8th Cir. 2007). 
In United States v. Canty, a defendant was charged with counterfeiting. 
United States v. Canty, 499 F.3d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 2007). He wished to testify 
that his intent was to use the bills to help the police make drug busts. Id. The 
Government argued this was in fact a public-authority defense, which under the 
rules required advance notice to them. Id. The trial court restricted Canty’s 
testimony on his intent. Id. The circuit court found that this restriction was an 
error because Canty had never actually claimed he was ordered to print the fake 
money by police. Id. at 732. However odd or improbable Canty’s scheme, he 
should have been allowed to put it before the jury. Id. Failure to do so was error 
and it was not harmless. Id. at 734.  
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 492 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(determining that the trial court erred in telling the defendant that he could 
keep his current lawyer or proceed pro se, forcing him to choose between the 
right to testify and the right to counsel). The court forced the defendant to make 
that choice after assuming that the defense lawyer’s motion to withdraw was 
occasioned by the concern that the defendant would commit perjury. Id. at 492 
n.3. 
 106. See United States v. Davis, 974 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(describing a prosecutor’s request that the court “instruct Davis about the 
possibilities and penalties of a perjury charge were he to take the stand and 
lie”). And this, too, incidentally, is not structural error. See United States v. 
Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 372 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (noting that the 
defendant must prove “substantial prejudice” to obtain a reversal of conviction 
on the grounds that the prosecutor deprived him of defense testimony by 
threatening a witness). 
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B. The Inconsistency Between the Autonomy-Based Right to 
Testify and Strickland’s Purpose of Ensuring “Reliability” 
of Trial Results 
The problem is that Strickland’s concern is with whether a 
lawyer’s incompetence was so egregious that the “trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.”107 By contrast, 
“personal” rights, like taking the stand, involve a defendant’s 
autonomy, his day in court, the right to meet his accusers 
himself, the chance to participate in settling his own legal fate, 
and the notion (as Justice Frankfurter wrote) that the “most 
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as 
the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for 
himself.”108 These considerations, under this “free choice” line, 
hold even if a defendant’s election—like the choice to proceed pro 
se—is an ill-advised one that makes an unreliable conviction 
more likely. Courts consider an adverse result to be fair because 
the accused, so long as his lawyer has reasoned with him about 
the perils, alone bears the consequences of his choice.109 It is an 
irony that a right in which outcome is irrelevant is reviewed 
under a test that focuses on outcome.  
Strickland’s inquiry asks whether a lawyer fails his client, 
yet suppressing a clear constitutional right seems ipso facto 
failure.110 Strickland requires us to “indulge a strong 
                                                                                                     
 107. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see also Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (explaining that the Strickland inquiry asks 
whether the “result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable”). 
 108. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion) 
(Frankfurter, J.). 
 109. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“The defendant, and 
not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction” 
and so his choices regarding his defense, even if “ultimately to his own 
detriment[,] . . . must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is 
the lifeblood of the law.’”). 
 110. Theoretically, Strickland might remain appropriate in true 
ineffectiveness cases: say, a defendant claims counsel was deficient in failing to 
inform him of his right to testify. See Sexton v. French, 163 F.3d 874, 882 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (“Because the burden of ensuring that a criminal defendant is 
informed of the nature and existence of the right to testify rests upon trial 
counsel, the burden shouldered by trial counsel is a component of effective 
assistance of counsel.”); see also Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 397 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“[E]very authority we are aware of that has addressed the matter of 
counsel’s failure to advise a client of the right to testify has done so under 
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presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance,”111 but can a lawyer make a 
valid choice to violate his client’s prerogative?112 Strickland 
demands that the defendant “overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy,’”113 yet what of pronouncements 
that the decision to testify is never merely a matter of strategy 
but always a matter of personal right?114 Clearly there is tension 
                                                                                                     
Strickland’s two-prong framework.”). Or when a defendant claims counsel was 
deficient in telling him that the court will not let him testify. See United States 
v. Hubbard, 638 F.3d 866, 868–70 (8th Cir. 2011) (evaluating an ineffectiveness 
claim where defense counsel told defendant that the district court would not 
permit defendant to testify in his own defense). Or when a defendant claims 
counsel was deficient in failing to seek a stay to allow an ill defendant to testify 
upon recovery. See United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 996–97 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (“Tavares argues that his counsel’s failure to take appropriate measures 
in light of his health problems effectively deprived him of his right to testify.”). 
Or when a defendant claims counsel was deficient in advising him to testify but 
neglecting to prepare him adequately or misjudging its scope. See United States 
v. Smith, 421 F. App’x 889, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Together, Smith contends, 
these shortcomings contributed to her decision to give limited testimony at trial, 
led to the government’s allegedly damaging cross-examination, and prejudiced 
her defense.”). Or when a defendant claims counsel was deficient in failing to 
explain that whether to testify is ultimately the defendant’s decision. See United 
States v. Herschberger, No. 90-3237, 1991 WL 136337, at *3 (10th Cir. July 24, 
1991) (stating that the defendant asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim “that his counsel failed to advise him he had the right to decide whether 
he would testify”). But our view is that, for purposes of doctrinal clarity and 
consistency, such allegations of error ought to be considered together with 
actual coercion cases and with purported violations by a court, a prosecutor, or a 
statute, under an independent, freestanding right-to-testify analysis. 
 111. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 112. In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, sitting as a district judge in Poe 
v. United States:  
The right to testify is personal to the accused. He must make the 
ultimate decision on whether or not to take the stand. In this regard 
it is unlike other decisions, which are often called “trial decisions,” 
where it is counsel who decides whether to cross examine a particular 
witness or introduce a particular document. Here it is the accused 
who must decide and it is the duty of counsel to present to him the 
relevant information on which he may make an intelligent decision. 
Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 639 
(D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 113. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(“We hold that a defendant’s personal constitutional right to testify truthfully in 
his own behalf may not be waived by counsel as a matter of trial strategy.”). 
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between concessions that a defendant may choose to testify, 
“however irrational that insistence might be,”115 and denial of 
relief because that testimony “would [have] come at a high 
price.”116 Strickland is concerned with ensuring an “adversarial 
process,” but our scenario involves relations between attorney 
and client, not attorney and attorney.117 Finally, there is a poor fit 
between Strickland’s concern with the “justice of the finding of 
guilt” and the Faretta–Rock concern with the propriety of the 
mode by which guilt is found.118 The right to choose to testify is 
akin to the right to choose counsel, which under Gonzalez-Lopez 
endures regardless of how effective—or ineffective—one’s 
preferred lawyer may prove.119
Powell v. Alabama,120 the famous Scottsboro Boys case from 
1932, in which the lawyer did not interview his nine capital 
defendants until hours before the trial,121 is the patron saint of 
Assistance of Counsel Clause decisions. Justice Sutherland wrote 
a stirring tribute to the “guiding hand” of a defense lawyer.122 But 
the problem in coercive right-to-testify cases—the reason it is not 
a Strickland matter—is not too little but too much counsel, a 
guiding hand that has become overmastering. When this 
happens, as in Faretta, “in a very real sense, it is not his 
defense.”123 The right to self-representation, unlike the right to 
testify, is exercised only while unrepresented, but a client-
thwarting lawyer can still become, like an unwanted lawyer, “an 
                                                                                                     
 115. Id. 
 116. United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 117. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.21 (asserting that 
when evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, “appropriate inquiry focuses on the 
adversarial process, not on the accused’s relationship with his lawyer as such”). 
 118. For the phrase “justice of the finding of guilt” see United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976), the case from which Strickland purported to 
take its “prejudice” test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see 
also infra note 267. 
 119. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (finding 
that the defendant was erroneously deprived of his right to choice of counsel 
when the court prevented him from “being represented by the lawyer he 
want[ed], regardless of the quality of the representation he received”). 
 120. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 121. See id. at 52–58 (describing the factual circumstances relating to the 
appointment of counsel for the defendants). 
 122. See id. at 68–69 (describing the importance of the right to counsel).  
 123. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).  
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organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant 
and his right to defend himself personally.”124  
Thus, we have a constitutional right without a remedy. If a 
defendant is intimidated, pressured, or tricked by his lawyer into 
remaining seated—a typical threat is to withdraw midtrial—the 
defendant is all the same denied relief unless he can show that 
his testimony would have had decisive, but-for evidentiary effect, 
even though the right is not supposed to turn on evidence but 
autonomy. To that extent, he is denied his full opportunity to be 
heard, which the Supreme Court has never hesitated to call the 
“fundamental requisite of due process.”125 
C. The Ethical Consideration 
A lawyer is required to exercise most rights on the client’s 
behalf. A lawyer is also required to stand down if the client 
decides, contrary to his advice, to testify. Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a)126 says: “In a criminal case, the 
lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with 
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial 
and whether the client will testify.”127 To be sure, the Supreme 
Court reminds us that the “Constitution does not codify the 
                                                                                                     
 124. Id. at 820. 
 125. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395 (1914); see also California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (stating that the Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”); 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (stating that it is “axiomatic” that 
“a person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to defend”). This basic principle of legality sweeps well 
beyond the criminal context. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) 
(probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole 
revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (welfare recipient 
facing termination of assistance). 
 126. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012). 
 127. Id. (emphasis added). See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (“If the lawyer does not offer the 
client’s testimony and, on inquiry by the court into whether the client has been 
fully advised [of his] right to testify, the client states a desire to testify . . . the 
lawyer may have no other choice than to disclose . . . the client’s intention to 
testify falsely.”); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2(a) (3d 
ed. 1993) (listing “whether to testify in his or her own behalf” among the 
“decisions relating to the conduct of the case . . . ultimately for the accused”).  
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ABA’s Model Rules,”128 but, with equal sureness, it tells us that 
the judiciary has an “independent interest in ensuring that 
criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the 
profession.”129 Mild reproof is often the sole consequence of a 
lawyer’s right-to-testify violation.130 Counsel must advise on 
exercise of the right—and the line between advice and coercion is 
a question of fact on which many right-to-testify cases turn.131 
III. Is a Violation of the Right to Testify a “Structural” Error?132 
Arizona v. Fulminante133 reaffirmed the rule that “most 
constitutional errors can be harmless.”134 The varieties of 
harmless error are legion,135 and they even include errors that 
                                                                                                     
 128. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 790 (2009). 
 129. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). 
 130. See, e.g., Jiles v. United States, 72 F. App’x 493, 493 (7th Cir. 2003) (“If 
counsel actually said this, it is inexcusable behavior that likewise has the 
potential to establish prejudice for purposes of Strickland.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52–53 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(describing the principles guiding courts in drawing the “difficult line” between 
“earnest counseling and over coercion”).  
 132. In Part III we discuss four categories largely of our devising. There is 
probably a fifth category for judgments rendered by tribunals without 
jurisdiction, which is irrelevant here. See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 
71 (2003) (determining that a Ninth Circuit panel comprised of two Article III 
judges and one Article IV judge from the Northern Mariana Islands did not have 
the authority to decide the appeal); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 472 (1974) 
(concluding that the habeas corpus statute requires district courts, not 
magistrate judges alone, to conduct evidentiary habeas hearings); United States 
v. Amer.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 685–86 (1960) (concluding that 
retired circuit judges were ineligible to participate in the decision of a case on 
rehearing en banc). 
 133. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
 134. Id. at 306. 
 135. There are probably hundreds of examples. See, e.g., Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–15 (1999) (failure to charge jury on materiality element in 
tax-fraud prosecution subject to harmless-error review); Pope v. Illinois, 481 
U.S. 497, 501 (1987) (misstatement of element of offense subject to harmless-
error review); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 503–05 (1983) (improper 
comment on defendant’s silence at trial subject to harmless-error review); Moore 
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of identification obtained in 
violation of right to counsel subject to harmless-error review); Harrington v. 
California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969) (admission of nontestifying codefendant’s 
statement subject to harmless-error review). 
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cripple the presentation of a defense. For example, in Crane v. 
Kentucky,136 a defendant sought to introduce testimony attacking 
the credibility of his confession, a move the judge erroneously 
blocked as an attempt to relitigate a suppression motion.137 In 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall,138 a judge improperly prevented the 
accused from impeaching a government witness over his alleged 
dealmaking with the prosecution.139 These errors, the Court 
wrote in Fulminante, were subject to harmless-error analysis 
because they involved “trial error” that “occurred during the 
presentation of the case to the jury” and so could be 
“quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission [was] 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”140 Under that definition of 
trial error, the Court in Fulminante used harmless-error review 
in evaluating the admission of a coerced confession.141 By 
contrast, said the Court, “structural” errors occur when the 
“entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously 
affected” by the errors and so “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ 
standards.”142 
The inquiry into whether an error is structural really turns 
on the nature of the right and the effect of the error. The main 
complication is that the right to testify has two natures: first, as 
recognition of the defendant’s dignity, and second, as a means for 
him to strive for an acquittal. With respect to dignity, 
suppression is the error and only reversal can remedy it. But with 
respect to acquittal, the denial of the right is a reversible error 
only if the denial diminished his chance of acquittal; if it would 
not have helped in the end, there is nothing for a reviewing court 
                                                                                                     
 136. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). 
 137. See id. at 690–91 (“Under these principles, the Kentucky courts erred in 
foreclosing petitioner’s efforts to introduce testimony about the environment in 
which the police secured his confession.”). 
 138. Delaware v. Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
 139. See id. at 675–77 (describing the court’s failure to permit defense 
counsel to impeach a government witness during cross-examination). 
 140. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991). 
 141. See id. at 307–09 (analyzing precedent and determining that harmless-
error review was appropriate). 
 142. Id. at 309–10. 
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to do. No circuit court has held that a right-to-testify error is 
structural,143 yet some seem to consider the question open.144 
A. Structural Because Unassessable? 
Errors are structural for different reasons. Probably the most 
common reason is the difficulty of assessing the error’s effect.145 
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez a defendant was denied 
counsel of choice.146 The Court found the harmless-error and 
Strickland tests inapposite because they concern “identifiable 
mistakes” that judges can “assess” as they bear on the 
“outcome.”147 But to assess a wrongful denial of choice of counsel, 
judges would need to speculate on the probable acts of the 
                                                                                                     
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 100 F.3d 995, 997–98 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (describing the standard for reviewing defense counsel’s failure to permit 
defendant to testify and citing cases that support the court’s choice of standard). 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 712 n.8 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (arguing that “the right to testify is a constitutional right so basic to a 
fair trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error” yet stating 
that the Court “need not decide this question” (emphasis added)); see also 
Barrow v. Uchtman, 398 F.3d 597, 608 n.12 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) 
It is an interesting question whether defendant’s forfeiture of his 
constitutional right to testify, standing alone, is sufficiently 
“prejudicial” to warrant reversal of a conviction, or whether the 
decision not to testify—even when based on erroneous legal advice—
is not prejudicial unless it actually affects the outcome of the trial. 
Seventh Circuit precedent seems to support the latter view that 
defendants who allege they waived their right to testify still must 
show that this waiver was prejudicial, i.e., that the failure to testify 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
 145. We cite some better-known cases below, but there are others. In Stirone 
v. United States, a judge in a Hobbs Act case permitted a defendant to be tried 
on a charge not made in the indictment. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 
214 (1960). The Court stated that this error could never be harmless because 
“we cannot know whether the grand jury would have included [the added 
charge] in its indictment,” and yet “this might have been the basis upon which 
the trial jury convicted petitioner.” Id. at 219. In Ballard v. United States, 
violation of a statutory scheme resulted in an all-male jury panel. Ballard v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946). The Court considered the “subtle 
interplay of influence[s]” that women have on men, and men on women, to be 
“among the imponderables,” and reversed without any examination of prejudice. 
Id. at 193, 195–96.  
 146. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) 
(discussing the trial court’s limitations on defendant’s choice of counsel). 
 147. Id. at 150–51. 
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rejected counsel—from his relations with prosecutors to cross-
examination questions to courtroom style.148 In Holloway v. 
Arkansas,149 the Court found that unconstitutional multiple 
representation was not subject to harmless-error analysis 
because “to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the 
attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations 
would be virtually impossible.”150 In Waller v. Georgia,151 the 
Court held that the violation of the public-trial guarantee was not 
reviewable for harmless error152 because the “benefits of a public 
trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of 
chance.”153 In Vasquez v. Hillery,154 the Court held that when 
black citizens are “systemically excluded” from grand-jury 
service, the error is not “amenable” to harmless-error review 
because the “effect of the violation cannot be ascertained.”155 In 
Price v. Georgia,156 a state court reversed a manslaughter 
conviction because of an erroneous jury instruction,157 but the 
Court prohibited retrial on the original murder charge because it 
could not “determine whether or not the murder charge against 
petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious 
offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to 
debate his innocence.”158 In Gray v. Mississippi,159 the Court 
rejected the argument that an improper for-cause exclusion of a 
prospective juror reluctant to impose the death penalty could be 
harmless, even when a prosecutor would otherwise have 
exercised a peremptory challenge, for “we cannot know whether 
                                                                                                     
 148. Id.  
 149. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
 150. Id. at 491. 
 151. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
 152. Id. at 49. 
 153. Id. at 49 n.9. 
 154. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
 155. Id. at 263–64; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986) 
(reviewing the effects of racial discrimination in jury selection not only on the 
accused but also on society, the public’s impression of the court’s competence, 
and the excluded juror). 
 156. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). 
 157. Id. at 324. 
 158. Id. at 331. 
 159. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987). 
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in fact he would have had this peremptory challenge left to 
use.”160 And in Sullivan v. Louisiana,161 the Court found that an 
erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt could never be 
harmless because the consequences were “necessarily 
unquantifiable and indeterminable.”162  
Does the unassessability rationale apply in the right-to-
testify context?163 Courts do identify the “special significance” 
that a defendant’s testimony can have, considering the “power of 
a face-to-face appeal”164 and “inherent significance” of his word.165 
The dissenters in Foster v. Delo,166 for instance, felt that the 
                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 664–65. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (holding 
that a death sentence “cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or 
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because 
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or 
religious scruples against its infliction”).  
 161. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
 162. Id. at 281–82. 
 163. Other mainstays of due process jurisprudence certainly partake of this 
unassessability rationale but are better discussed under different subheadings 
below. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in 
criminal cases); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased judge). 
 164. See, e.g., Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1172 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We 
are also cognizant of the power of a face-to-face appeal . . . . Mr. Cannon’s 
testimony, and his demeanor while testifying, could have special significance to 
the jury on this matter.”). In addition, a defendant’s testimony allows the jury to 
assess the defendant’s physiognomy and demeanor. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 
U.S. 127, 137–38 (1992) (reversing a conviction after the accused had been 
forcibly medicated with antipsychotics during trial—in part because medication 
could have “effects” on his “outward appearance” that “cannot be shown from a 
trial transcript”). In Sell v. United States, the Court noted that involuntary 
medications can “diminish the ability to express emotions” at trial, which can 
“undermine” its fairness. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 185–86 (2003). 
There are also cases teaching that elements of appearance in the form of 
clothing—like, presumably, elements of appearance in facial expressions—can 
have consequences not capturable by a transcript. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 
425 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1976) (forced wearing of prison clothing); Illinois v. Allen, 
397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (binding and gagging accused during trial).  
 165. See, e.g., Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The 
testimony of a criminal defendant at his own trial is unique and inherently 
significant.”); United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1178–79 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that the accused, with his knowledge of facts, his testimony, and his 
demeanor, is of “prime importance” at trial); United Sates v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 
971 (9th Cir. 1971) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (“The facial expressions of a 
witness may convey much more to the trier of the facts than do the spoken 
words.”). 
 166. Foster v. Delo, 39 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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accused’s testimony could have been decisive against a prosecutor 
who “dehumanized” the defendant by labeling him a “that”—as in 
“that (indicating) is no man.”167 There is a sense in which the 
force of ungiven testimony is immeasurable.168 It goes beyond the 
substance of his testimony, but rather is a matter of a willingness 
to speak directly to those judging you, to refuse to hide behind the 
Fifth Amendment, to put on display any emotion that testifying 
arouses, whether a tremble in the voice of one falsely accused or 
the manufactured confidence of one seeking to lie his way out of 
guilt.  
The elusive effect of all this is hardly captured by words on a 
page. This sort of evidence is of a quality different from other 
types that a defendant might present. Testimony from the 
individual at the heart of events is uncommonly probative. 
Confessions—another form of defendant testimony—may be the 
“most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted 
against him.”169 They “come from the actor himself, the most 
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about 
his past conduct” and have such a “profound impact on the jury” 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. at 885–86 (Bright, J., dissenting). 
 168. See Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., 
dissenting) 
[T]he right to testify resembles other rights recognized as requiring 
automatic reversal because it is impossible, and perhaps improper, to 
attempt to judge the effect that the defendant’s appearance on the 
stand would have had on the jury . . . . Judges can, with a reasonable 
degree of assurance, identify and sort out merely trivial or cumulative 
evidence and form a reasoned judgment on possible impact upon the 
jury of what it erroneously heard or failed to hear. There is a degree 
of speculation, but the risk is acceptable. Where the error is in 
keeping the defendant from the stand the judge can consider the 
content of what the defendant might have said the same as for a 
nonparty witness. But he cannot weigh the possible impact upon the 
jury of factors such as the defendant’s willingness to mount the stand 
rather than avail himself of the shelter of the Fifth Amendment, his 
candor and courtesy (or lack of them), his persuasiveness, his respect 
for court processes. These are elusive and subjective factors, even 
among persons who might perceive and hear the defendant, but more 
significantly, they are matters neither communicated to an appellate 
judge nor susceptible of communication to him. Appellate attempts to 
appraise impact upon the jury of such unknown and unknowable 
matters is purely speculative. 
 169. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–40 (1968) (White, J., 
dissenting).  
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that we “may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind 
even if told to do so.”170 If a defendant’s testimony can doom him 
in compelled-confession cases, why might not it save him in right-
to-testify cases?  
On the other hand, the unadmitted testimony can almost 
always be described later in hearings and affidavits (e.g., “I would 
have said this, to establish that”) and at that point it can be 
weighed alongside the rest of the record.171 If Fulminante holds 
that the erroneous admission of a defendant’s testimonial 
statement can be harmless,172 why should the erroneous exclusion 
of testimony require reversal? Compelled testimony, too, is a 
matter of the gravest dignity, volition, and fairness. Fulminante 
suggests that, if the criterion is assessability of the error’s effect, 
the denial of the right to testify is a trial error.173 The accused in 
                                                                                                     
 170. Id. 
 171. But this is not permitted in all circumstances. In Luce v. United States, 
the Court held that to preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior 
conviction under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a), a defendant must testify—otherwise a 
court cannot assess harmlessness. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 n.5 
(1984). Thus, a defendant could not use an offer of proof on appeal as a way to 
allow an evaluation of harmlessness.  
 172. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (“When reviewing 
the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, the appellate court, as it 
does with the admission of other forms of improperly admitted evidence, simply 
reviews the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine 
whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). 
 173. One could argue that Gonzalez-Lopez supports the proposition that 
right-to-testify errors are structural. Under its rule, the dissent observed, a 
“defendant who is erroneously required to go to trial with a second-choice 
attorney is automatically entitled to a new trial even if this attorney performed 
brilliantly.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 160 (2006) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). The majority required the stringent remedy because of the 
unassessability of what might have been, see id. at 150 (majority opinion) (“We 
have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel 
of choice . . . unquestionably qualifies as ‘structural error. . . .’ It is impossible to 
know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to 
quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the 
proceedings.”), but why does it even matter that a defendant gets his counsel of 
choice? It seems linked to autonomy. Certainly Justice Scalia made clear it was 
not merely about a fair trial. See id. at 146 (“In sum, the right at stake here is 
the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was 
violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous.”). Nonetheless, 
because the Court did not invoke that rationale, and in fact labeled it a different 
“criterion” for finding structural error, id. at 149 n.4, our reliance is hesitant.  
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the right-to-testify context, unlike a Faretta defendant,174 does 
not get an entirely different proceeding as a result of the error, 
but rather a trial that is simply missing a piece of evidence—an 
important piece, but one that can be ascertained post-trial. 
Gonzalez-Lopez explained that we cannot know what the lawyer-
who-might-have-been would have done at trial;175 similarly, we 
cannot know how a Faretta defendant might have acquitted 
himself. But where the defendant is prohibited from testifying, no 
alternate universe of possibility has been cut off. And this, under 
this particular line of structural-error precedent, seems to make 
all the difference. 
B. Structural Because Risk of Prejudice Too Great? 
A second rationale for structural error, especially in 
prejudicial-publicity cases,176 appears when there is “such a 
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently 
lacking in due process.”177 The concern is that a pervasive, 
insinuating press is likely (even if undetectably) to erode juror 
objectivity.178 Or, in Tumey v. Ohio,179 the Court invalidated a 
procedure whereby a judge, the village mayor, received fees and 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975) (vacating the 
judgment and remanding Faretta’s case for new proceedings after Faretta was 
forced to accept appointed counsel despite requests to represent himself). 
 175. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) 
(describing the Court’s inability to determine how a different lawyer would have 
handled a case and the impact those decisions might have had on the outcome of 
the proceedings). 
 176. See generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (concluding that the 
defendant was deprived of due process by the televising of his criminal trial); 
Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (finding that defendant was denied right to 
an impartial jury due to extensive media coverage of the case in months prior to 
the trial); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353–58 (1966) (describing 
the courtroom as a “carnival atmosphere” and the press’ impact on jurors who 
became “celebrities,” subject to months of skewed press coverage urging death 
penalty).  
 177. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542–43. 
 178. See id. at 545 (noting that it is “highly probable” that invasive press 
coverage “will have a direct bearing on [a juror’s] vote as to guilt or innocence” 
due to the juror feeling “the pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors 
have their eyes upon them”). 
 179. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
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costs upon convictions but not acquittals;180 this would “offer a 
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the 
burden of proof.”181 But the impartiality concerns that justify 
structural-error analysis in these cases do not relate to the 
autonomy concerns underlying the right to testify. 
C. Structural Because Harm at Trial Irrelevant? 
A third rationale is the “irrelevance of harmlessness.”182 This 
is the reason why Faretta errors are structural. In McKaskle v. 
Wiggins,183 the Supreme Court said: “Since the right of self-
representation is a right that when exercised usually increases 
the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its 
denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis. The right is 
either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”184 
In Johnstone v. Kelly,185 defendant Johnstone wanted to 
represent himself, yet the trial court appointed counsel.186 This 
ruling was reversed.187 On retrial, the judge told Johnstone he 
had to go pro se—as he had demanded.188 But the circuit court 
rejected the argument that Johnstone could not make a fresh 
election this time around: the trial court’s error was that it 
“denied him the choice whether to have counsel or proceed pro se. 
It is that choice that must be accorded at a retrial.”189 
If Rock v. Arkansas declared the right to testify “[e]ven more 
fundamental to a personal defense” than the right of self-
representation,190 would not the right to testify, logically, be in 
                                                                                                     
 180. Id. at 520. 
 181. Id. at 532. 
 182. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–49, 149 n.4. (2006). 
 183. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
 184. Id. at 177 n.8. 
 185. Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d. 214 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 186. Id. at 215–16. 
 187. Id. at 218. 
 188. See Johnstone v. Kelly, 812 F.2d 821, 821 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing the 
State’s argument that it could “satisfy its obligation to [the defendant] by 
affording him a retrial at which he would be required to represent himself” 
(emphasis added)).  
 189. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
 190. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).  
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the structural class? Judge Godbold made the argument in his 
dissent in Wright v. Estelle: “[w]hen personal rights are involved, 
the harmless error rule does not apply because we are not 
concerned with the ‘ultimate consequences’ of trial, but with 
preventing the individual from being overcome by the criminal 
process.”191 Is this right?192 If a defendant was silenced, but would 
have testified only on some entirely peripheral point, must this 
require retrial? In one sense, the error would not “affect” his 
“substantial rights,” which obligates courts to ignore it.193 On the 
other hand, if the right is simply to be able to choose to testify 
truthfully, no matter how significant the testimony might be as a 
piece of evidence, a violation eliminates the right. The answer 
hinges on what you believe to be the particular harm being 
reviewed for harmlessness: if the wrong is the denial of choice, 
error is never harmless; if the wrong is impairing a defense as it 
affects a jury’s verdict, error here could very well be harmless. 
                                                                                                     
 191. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the harmless-error rule is inapplicable to double-
jeopardy analysis (citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970))). Judge 
Reinhardt made the argument in his dissent in United States v. Martinez. See 
generally United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). He argued: (1) because the 
Chapman inquiry “involves delicate judgments about fact specific situations, 
errors that have an indeterminate impact upon the appellate record cannot be 
harmless” and (2) “harmless error analysis, designed to insure correct outcomes, 
is essentially irrelevant to a panoply of constitutional rights that protect 
individual dignity.” Id. at 770 n.23. Many a petitioner has echoed this argument; 
all have been met with rejection. See, e.g., Skeens v. Haskins, 4 F. App’x 236, 
238 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Skeens’s argument that his championed error was 
‘structural error’ is without merit. Most errors do not automatically render a 
trial unfair and thus, can be harmless.” (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279, 306 (1991))). 
 192. The Supreme Court reiterated in 2006 that “[o]nly in rare cases” should 
an error be deemed “structural, and thus requir[ing] automatic reversal.” 
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006). A good example of structural 
error occurred in Gomez v. United States: a magistrate judge, exceeding his 
statutory power, picked a jury in a felony trial without meaningful district court 
review; the Court said there would be no harmless-error analysis. Gomez v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989). 
 193. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of 
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the 
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (defining harmless error as “[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights 
must be disregarded”). 
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D. Structural Because Procedurally Intolerable? 
Sometimes the Court refuses to consider harmlessness 
because the right is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial.”194 
These include the rights to counsel in criminal cases (Gideon v. 
Wainwright);195 to trial in serious criminal cases (Duncan v. 
Louisiana);196 and to have appointed counsel prosecute certain 
meritorious appeals (Anders v. California).197 These holdings 
invoke some of the rationales already described, but the thrust is 
that in such cases the problem is not merely a reliable conviction 
but “fair procedure”198 and preventing an individual from simply 
being hustled through the system. It is not just an evidentiary 
matter or a concern about just outcomes but a problem with 
means.199 It is no rhetorical excess to say that we adhere to forms 
of procedure, for their own sake, almost religiously, because those 
procedures work to minimize discretion and safeguard justice and 
because that is just how we do things in this country. 
The rationale of procedural impermissibility may apply here 
in that a silenced defendant has had a right withdrawn from 
him—regardless of whether he faced overwhelming evidence or 
wished to say things that would have angered jurors and 
provoked a more severe sentence. Like a man who is forced to 
plead guilty, he is wronged in a way independent of concerns 
about accuracy of result. He is wronged like a convict who is 
denied a right to allocute, though he could hardly have swayed a 
judge. Or like a man who sought jury trial but got a bench trial, 
though clearly he would have been convicted under either fact-
                                                                                                     
 194. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). 
 195. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 196. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 197. See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
 198. See id. at 741 (“We have concluded that California’s action does not 
comport with fair procedure and lacks that equality that is required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 199. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1960) (explaining 
that the accused’s guilt or innocence is not the only consideration in a 
proceeding and noting that “important human values are sacrificed” when the 
government is permitted to use unfair procedures to secure a conviction); see 
also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959) (noting that “in the end 
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict 
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves”). 
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finder. These are simply choices a man facing the State has. On 
this theory, the question that most federal courts ask when a 
defendant claims his right to testify was abridged—Did it matter 
in the end?—is the wrong one. The proper question is: Was this 
an invalid proceeding? Is gagging a man at this dramatic 
crossroad in his life very different from trying him in absentia? 
It comes down to how one reads this sentence from 
Fulminante: 
[T]he harmless error doctrine is essential to preserve the 
“principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to 
decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal 
process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial 
rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial 
error.”200 
So are we talking here about the factual question of guilt? Or 
underlying fairness? Or both? Or autonomy? We know trial 
fairness is not the sum of things. In Lafler v. Cooper,201 the 
Supreme Court said that when pleas are mishandled by defense 
counsel, the issue was not the “fairness or reliability of the trial 
but the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded 
it.”202 Even if the trial reaches an accurate result, there remains a 
sense that a wrong was done which requires its own remedy. This 
is why, under Hamilton v. Alabama,203 we “do not stop to 
determine whether prejudice resulted”204 to a defendant left to 
face arraignment without a lawyer—even if it can be shown that 
the lack of counsel had no effect whatsoever on the trial.205 In 
Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court similarly declared that the “right to 
                                                                                                     
 200. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (quoting Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
 201. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 202. Id. at 1388. 
 203. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
 204. Id. at 55. 
 205. See id. (“When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, 
we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. . . . [T]he degree of 
prejudice can never be known. Only the presence of counsel could have enabled 
this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead 
intelligently.”). 
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select counsel of one’s choice” has “never been derived from the 
Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial.”206 
This is a difficult question. On the one hand, there is 
doubtless precedent to support the notion that the right to testify 
truthfully, bound up with the notion of not treating a man as a 
voiceless object to be disposed of by lawyers, demands reversal to 
remedy error.207 It is a question of process, not evidentiary 
weight.208 At the same time, other precedent suggests that this 
right, despite its uncontested importance, is still at bottom a trial 
                                                                                                     
 206. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006). There is 
something of a tension, however, with the choice rationale and Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). In Wheat, Chief Justice Rehnquist (who dissented in 
Faretta) wrote that the right to counsel exists to ensure that a man does not get 
railroaded by the State. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158–59 (asserting that the right 
to counsel exists to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial and 
noting that “an unaided layman may have little skill in arguing the law or in 
coping with an intricate procedural system”). Once that guarantee is enforced, 
the defendant has some latitude in choice, but a fair trial is always the main 
thing. Id. A bigger problem is that Wheat rejects the argument that a man 
should have his lawyer of choice and that if his lawyer has a conflict of interest, 
it is simply the client’s choice to waive. See id. at 164 (“The District Court must 
recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that 
presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but 
by a showing of a serious potential for conflict.”). Chief Justice Rehnquist said 
that courts have an independent interest in ethical standards and in trials with 
the appearance of integrity. See id. at 160 (“Federal courts have an independent 
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical 
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who 
observe them.”). Perhaps this represents a shift away from autonomy, but in 
any event our situation is still nearer to Faretta than Wheat. Faretta, like the 
right to testify, concerns what a man whose liberty is at stake may do for 
himself. Wheat involves what one is allowed to have another man do on one’s 
behalf. Perhaps Gonzalez-Lopez shifted us back toward choice. Justice Scalia, 
speaking of Wheat, wrote: “It is one thing to conclude that the right to counsel of 
choice may be limited by the need for fair trial, but quite another to say that the 
right does not exist unless its denial renders the trial unfair.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. at 147 n.3. Besides, if courts have an interest in ethical standards, one 
worthy way to uphold these standards would be to properly remedy the 
unethical misconduct of defense lawyers who prevent their clients from 
testifying. 
 207. See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978) (en 
banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting) (stating that “the right to testify resembles other 
rights recognized as requiring automatic reversal”). 
 208. See id. at 1075 (stating the belief “that the federal constitution now 
requires state and federal courts to allow a defendant to testify” and that 
“[m]ost often the right is treated as part of due process”). 
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right.209 It allows an accused to proffer evidence to attempt to 
exonerate himself. A chance at trial victory is why the common 
law disability was lifted. It is why defendants speak. It is why 
they complain about denials of the right. And this right can only 
be exercised at trial. If testimony cannot under any 
circumstances have secured a defendant an acquittal, a new trial 
would be futile. 
But we reason as follows: the right to testify derives in part 
from the Fifth Amendment. It mirrors the right against 
compelled self-incrimination; so said the Court in Rock when it 
called the right to testify the “necessary corollary” of the right to 
remain silent.210 And there seems no logical reason to protect the 
right against forced speech more than the right against forced 
silence: compulsion to testify to your detriment is just as bad as 
compulsion against testifying to your benefit.211 Yet Fulminante 
commands that a Fifth Amendment violation, even one involving 
                                                                                                     
 209. See, e.g., United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (characterizing the right to testify as a “fundamental trial right[]”). 
 210. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52–53 (1987). 
 211. Of course, the exercise of one right waives the other. If anything, it 
seems safer to presume that the right to silence is the default preference. See 
Harvey v. Shillinger, 76 F.3d 1528, 1535 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A defendant’s choice 
to exercise his right to allocution, like the choice to exercise the right to testify, 
is entirely his own . . . . Once a defendant chooses to testify . . . he waives his 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.”); United States v. Pennycooke, 
65 F.3d 9, 11 (3d. Cir. 1995) (noting that “[e]xercise of either the right to testify 
or the right not to testify necessarily would waive the other right” and 
cautioning that a court’s advice regarding the right to testify could 
inappropriately influence a defendant to waive his or her right to remain silent).  
Another interesting problem is how a pro se defendant testifies. See 
generally United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989). In Nivica, the 
examination began and ended thus:  
MR. WELLINGTON: The question is: Does Mark Pedley Wellington, 
a/k/a Jack Williams, have anything to hide? 
The answer is No. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Please strike the answer. Please wait until 
an objection is made, if any is made, before you answer. 
MR. WELLINGTON: Well, I guess I can’t ask myself any more 
questions then. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused. 
Id. at 1120.  
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actual coercion, does not mean automatic reversal.212 A violation 
of the right to testify, even one involving suppression, likewise 
should not bring on instant reversal.213 Both errors may involve 
egregious tramplings on fundamental rights, but both errors 
occur within a larger record that allows a court to reconstruct the 
probable result had no mistakes been made. The right to testify 
emanates from the Compulsory Process Clause214: a defendant 
may almost always call witnesses, including himself.215 
Washington v. Texas216 declared that the “right to present the 
defendant’s version of the facts” is a “fundamental element of due 
process.”217 But like with the Fifth Amendment, errors under this 
Clause have not been declared, without more, to be structural.218  
                                                                                                     
 212. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295–302 (applying harmless-
error analysis to a coerced confession). 
 213. Really the only lingering question is whether Fulminante would control 
if the right against compelled self-incrimination was flouted flagrantly enough 
in court to require a finding of mistrial. The Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson 
observed that certain “deliberate and especially egregious” errors could destroy 
the integrity of proceedings even if the error was normally of the “trial type.” 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993). If so, might the mirror-
image analogue be a total suppression of the right to testify? It is interesting to 
recall that Chapman v. California said that “there are some constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). Among these 
rights, the Court cites the defendant’s right, under Payne v. Arkansas, to not 
have coerced confessions produced against him. See id. at 25−26 (stating that a 
prosecutor commenting on a defendant’s failure to testify “can no more be 
considered harmless than the introduction against a defendant of a coerced 
confession”); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (reversing a judgment 
because the court admitted a coerced confession into evidence). But Payne 
ceased being the law on the day Fulminante was announced. See Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 288 (stating that the decision “abandons” the Court’s 
previous rulings in cases such as Payne). 
 214. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor . . . .”). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 217. Id. at 18. 
 218. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987) 
Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to 
determine whether it contains information that probably would have 
changed the outcome of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new 
trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain no such information, 
or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. 
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Our conclusion is the only practical one. If right-to-testify 
errors are declared to be structural, courts will never find them, 
especially when the error can be asserted in most cases in which 
the defendant did not testify. It makes sense not to call it 
structural error and instead to seek other ways to invigorate the 
right. 
IV. The Proper Test: Harmless Error Under Chapman/Kotteakos 
If structural error and Strickland are not proper standards 
for assessing abridgements of the right to testify, that leaves us 
with the doctrine of harmless error.219 The standard, on direct 
review, is set out in Chapman v. California220: “before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able 
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”221 In collateral attacks, courts apply the supposedly more 
                                                                                                     
Compulsory Process errors are not structural, but they are also almost never 
harmless. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006) (holding that 
the South Carolina rule limiting the defendant’s evidence of third-party guilt to 
facts that are inconsistent with his own guilt violates the Compulsory Process 
Clause); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (holding that a state 
“voucher” rule violates due process). 
The right to testify, as noted above, also finds a source in the Due Process 
Clause, but that Clause comprehends too many rights in too many 
circumstances to make any informative generalization about structural error. 
 219. We realize that, generally, under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a failure to object to a supposed constitutional error entitles the 
complainant only to plain error review, where he has the burden. See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered 
even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”). But the nature of the 
denial of the right to testify is such that, in the instances most concerning to us, 
the defending attorney would have to object to himself. It would also be unfair to 
require the defendant to object (where? how?) to his counsel’s effort to silence 
him. In any event plain-error review is more appropriate than Strickland review 
(same burdens, but no presumptions; and it does not turn on the wrong clause). 
In order to make our point we will leave this particular question—plain error or 
harmless error—aside. 
 220. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 221. Id. at 24. Chapman also involved defendant testimony. Id. In that case, 
a prosecutor commented on petitioner’s failure to testify. Id. at 19. This was the 
very concern that prompted the common-law ban on an accused’s testimony, 
which Rock v. Arkansas finally did away with. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 
44, 62 (1987) (rejecting Arkansas’s limitation on the defendant’s right to testify 
on his own behalf). Chapman speaks in terms of affecting the “result of the 
140 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95 (2013) 
error-forgiving standard of Kotteakos v. United States222: error 
requires reversal only if it had a “substantial and injurious effect 
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”223 The principle 
behind all harmless-error tests—that courts will not bother with 
futile exercises—is expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 2111,224 which directs 
courts to review for legal errors “without regard” to those that do 
not affect the parties’ “substantial rights.”225 Consider how 
dramatically different this is from Strickland’s prejudice test, 
where the petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”226 
                                                                                                     
trial,” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, but the standard today applies to pretrial 
proceedings, post-trial proceedings, plea negotiations, etc.  
An amusing historical note: the lawyer who prevailed in Chapman was Mr. 
Morris Lavine of Los Angeles, the self-proclaimed “‘attorney for the damned.’” 
See Cecilia Rasmussen, Cathedral’s Site a Legal Battleground, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
2, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-12-02/local/me-4912_1_legal-battle 
ground (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). He represented mobster Mickey Cohen, Teamster Jimmy Hoffa, and 
the kidnappers of Frank Sinatra, Jr. See id. (listing Lavine’s infamous clients). 
In 1932, he was himself convicted for extortion, served ten months in jail, 
received a full pardon, and again became a sought-after lawyer. See id. 
(discussing Lavine’s jail time and his reinstatement as a lawyer); see also David 
Rosenzweig, POW Camp Atrocities Led to Treason Trial, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 
2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/20/local/me-onthelaw20 (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2012) (elaborating on Lavine’s representation of traitor Tomoyo 
Kawakita) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 222. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
 223. Id. at 776. The application of this standard to collateral attack was the 
work of Brecht v. Abrahamson. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637−38 
(1993) (“The Kotteakos standard is thus better tailored to the nature and 
purpose of collateral review.”); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) 
(favoring the Kotteakos standard for collateral review). In Brecht, Justice 
Stevens, whose concurrence provided the fifth vote, wrote that although the 
Kotteakos standard was “less stringent” than Chapman, “[g]iven the critical 
importance of the faculty of judgment in administering either standard . . . that 
difference is less significant than it might seem.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 643 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 224. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006). 
 225. Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). 
 226. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 694 (1984) (emphasis added).  
WHY STRICKLAND IS THE WRONG TEST 141 
A. Harmless Error Versus Strickland Prejudice? 
But aren’t harmless error and Strickland prejudice 
essentially the same inquiry? Aren’t both concerned with the 
question: Did it matter in the end? Only superficially. In 
Strickland the burden is on the defendant;227 in Chapman and 
Kotteakos it is on the government.228 Strickland imposes a “strong 
presumption of reliability” about the result;229 the harmless-error 
statute expresses a “congressional preference for determining 
‘harmless error’ without the use of presumptions.”230 Strickland 
tells us to presume in favor of attorney competence;231 harmless 
error, again, is freighted with no such presumptions.232 
Strickland looks for a “reasonable probability” that the result was 
affected by the error;233 harmless error asks whether error was 
harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt”234 or caused a “substantial 
and injurious effect.”235 Strickland’s thrust is to require a court to 
be quite sure, before reversing, that the verdict was attributable 
                                                                                                     
 227. See id. at 696 (stating that the defendant has the burden of proving 
prejudice in a claim of ineffective counsel). 
 228. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) 
Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly 
prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the 
person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is 
for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put 
the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there 
was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained 
judgment. 
See also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 771–72 (1946) (finding that 
the government did not meet its burden because it did not adequately justify the 
errors as harmless). 
 229. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
 230. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–08 (2009). This does not apply 
in collateral attacks, where there are presumptions of various sorts. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006) (stating that factual determinations should be 
presumed correct). 
 231. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[T]he court should recognize that 
counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”). 
 232. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (rejecting the use of presumptions in 
determining prejudicial effects of error). 
 233. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 695 (1984). 
 234. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 235. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 
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to counsel’s error;236 Chapman’s thrust is to require a court to be 
quite sure, before affirming, that it was “surely unattributable to 
the error.”237 Kotteakos, meanwhile, tells a reviewing judge, when 
error is present in the record, to set aside the verdict unless he or 
she “is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but 
very slight effect.”238  
Both standards, to be sure, are rarely met. But the harmless-
error test at least has the virtue of giving the defendant a shot, 
unburdened by irrelevant presumptions. The difference is borne 
out in the success rates. A 2007 study considered federal circuit 
habeas cases between 2003 and 2006 in which a state court found 
error but declared it harmless;239 the circuits, on average, 
disagreed in 23.5% of cases.240 By contrast, a study that same 
year found that less than 1% of Strickland challenges result in 
habeas relief.241 This is the difference between asking a court to 
say that a mistake was made (what trial is free of them?) and 
                                                                                                     
 236. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (requiring the defendant to show that 
“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial”). 
 237. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added) 
(discussing Chapman).  
 238. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).  
 239. See Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Note, Mostly Harmless: An Analysis of Post-
AEDPA Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Harmless Error Determinations, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 805, 809–12 (2007) (discussing results from a survey of 
habeas corpus cases from January 2003 through June 2006).  
 240. Id. at 809. Similarly, a study coauthored by Judge Posner and William 
Landes considers the 963 federal appellate criminal cases (apparently direct 
appeals) decided between 1996 and 1998 in which the majority decided whether 
an error was “harmless.” William M. Landes & Richard Posner, Harmless Error 
1 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 101 (2d 
Series), 2000), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/101.WML_. 
Harmless.pdf. In 19% of the cases, defendants had part of their sentence or 
conviction reversed, remanded, or vacated. Id. at 21. 
 241. Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Envisioning Post-Conviction 
Review for the Twenty-First Century, 78 MISS. L.J. 433, 440 (2008). Another 
study considering federal cases in 1990 and 1992 found that of 584 ineffective-
assistance claims, the petition was “granted” in less than 1%. VICTOR E. FLANGO, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 62 tbl. 
17 (1994). A third study examined more than 2,500 California state and federal 
appellate decisions in which an ineffective-assistance claim was raised. 
Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systematic Factors that 
Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 
263, 323 (2009). It found only 104 decisions in which both deficiency and 
prejudice were found, a success rate of 4%. Id. at 323−24. 
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asking a court to declare an officer of the bar incompetent (rarely 
true, one hopes).242 Professor Nancy J. King, Assistant Reporter 
to the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and a coauthor of the latter study, writes that success 
under Strickland remains “essentially hypothetical” in noncapital 
cases.243  
Courts are ill disposed toward ineffective-assistance petitions 
because they are the “inevitable” claim.244 Worse yet, they are 
unlimited in scope: they can be alleged against everything from 
egregious acts like pleading a man guilty against his will245 to (let 
us imagine) a simple Homeric nod over one possible objection that 
could have been made at some point during a ten-week trial. 
Strickland claims also evade the general prohibition on raising 
new arguments or presenting new evidence. A decade after 
Strickland, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, described 
ineffectiveness claims as “the perfect tactical ‘open sesame’ to 
force re-reviews of close cases,” which exact a great toll, though 
                                                                                                     
 242. See United States v. Gaya, 647 F.3d 634, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2011) 
The defendant who has a lawyer, even an incompetent one, must to 
establish a violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance 
of counsel prove that he was prejudiced by the lawyer’s 
incompetence . . . and that’s a lot harder to do than opposing a 
prosecutor’s claim of harmless error, for the prosecutor must prove 
the harmlessness of a constitutional error—and prove it beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(citations omitted). 
 243. King & Hoffman, supra note 241, at 438. 
 244. The term is Chief Judge Easterbrook’s. See United States v. Ramsey, 
785 F.2d 184,193 (7th Cir. 1986) (“We are left with the inevitable claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also Wallace v. Davis, 362 F.3d 914, 919 
(7th Cir. 2004) (“Thus we arrive at what seems to be the inevitable argument in 
capital cases: that counsel at sentencing was ineffective.”); Palermo v. United 
States, No. 98-2890, 1999 WL 417867, at *1 (7th Cir. June 17, 1999) (stating 
that the motion included “the inevitable staple of § 2255 litigation—a claim that 
his prior lawyer was ineffective”). The best figures show that in U.S. district 
courts ineffective-assistance claims are raised in 81% of capital cases and 50.4% 
of noncapital cases. NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, 
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 64 tbl.15 
(2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. This is 
consistent with the figures from 1990 and 1992. See FLANGO, supra note 241, at 
45, 59 tbl.16. 
 245. See United States v. Pellerito, 701 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D.P.R. 1988) 
(claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly encouraged 
the defendant to plead guilty against his will). 
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to little end, on courts, prosecutors, and defense lawyers 
alike.246  
In one case, the two standards, harmless error and 
Strickland, were actually considered side-by-side to review the 
same acts.247 In United States v. Herschberger,248 decided before 
the Tenth Circuit adopted Strickland for right-to-testify 
claims, the defendant alleged that he told his attorney that he 
wanted to testify but “counsel said he would decide.”249 The 
defendant made both a right-to-testify claim on grounds that 
this right was suppressed and a Strickland claim for counsel’s 
failure to advise him that it was the defendant’s decision.250 
The court assumed that the first claim was amenable to 
harmless-error analysis;251 the other claim was under 
Strickland.252 The panel remanded for a hearing on the first 
claim but not the second!253  
Last year the Eleventh Circuit, apostle of Strickland in 
right-to-testify cases, was forced to revisit application of the 
harmless-error standard (as opposed to Strickland) because 
there was no assistance of counsel: the defendant acted pro se. 
                                                                                                     
 246. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1242 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). 
 247. See United States v. Herschberger, No. 90-3237, 1991 WL 136337, at *3 
(10th Cir. Jul. 24, 1991) (evaluating the defendant’s claim of ineffective counsel).  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at *2. 
 250. See id. at *1, *3 (describing the defendant’s claims). 
 251. See id. at *2 (determining that the district court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing to assess whether the defendant’s right to testify was 
violated). 
 252. See id. at *3 (using the Strickland test to evaluate the defendant’s 
claim that his counsel’s failure to advise him of his right to testify amounted to 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 253. See id. at *4 (“Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in failing to grant defendant a hearing on his claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In the evidentiary hearing on remand, the district court need only 
consider whether defendant’s right to testify was violated.”). Petitioners still 
occasionally make this claim. See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 227 F. App’x 
856, 860 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Franklin makes a number of arguments on appeal, 
including that the question is not whether his testimony would have altered the 
final outcome, rather it is whether he was denied the right to testify. Franklin, 
however, must establish deficient performance and prejudice to obtain relief in 
this § 2255 motion.”). 
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In United States v. Hung Thien Ly,254 the court recalled the 
Fifth Circuit’s application of harmless error in the great case of 
Wright v. Estelle,255 noted that it since applied the 
ineffectiveness framework in Teague, and concluded that the 
issue “will be resolved in another case.”256  
A 2012 case in the Fifth Circuit illustrates our proposition 
about the decisive significance of the standard of review. In 
United States v. Wines,257 a man received a 35-year sentence 
for drug dealing.258 The Government had one witness, another 
dealer, who testified under a plea; the defense had one real 
witness, Wines’s mother.259 Wines never testified.260 In a 
postconviction hearing, Wines claimed he told his lawyer that 
he wanted a “chance to fight for [his] life”261 by testifying; his 
attorney recalled that they had decided that Wines would not 
testify because of prior convictions.262 
A dissenting Judge Higginbotham was sure that 
Strickland prejudice was established.263 “This is no easy 
                                                                                                     
 254. United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 255. Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’d, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (en banc). All the same, the fractures over the right and the standard 
of review for errors were clear. The en banc decision said it “adheres to the panel 
opinion as published,” Wright, 572 F.2d at 1072, yet five judges, concurring, 
thought it a “disservice” to assume the existence of the right, and then declare a 
denial of it to be harmless error. Id. (concurring opinion). Three judges dissented 
on grounds that infringement of the right was structural error. See id. at 1080 
(dissenting opinion) (arguing that harmless error should not be applied in this 
case). In Hung Thien Ly, Judge Tjoflat (by some accounts the longest serving 
active federal judge) counted six of fourteen judges who seemed to agree with 
harmless-error review. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d at 1318 n.8. He himself was 
among the three dissenters some thirty-three years earlier! Id.; Wright, 572 
F.2d at 1074 (dissenting opinion) (listing Judge Tjoflat as a dissenter). 
 256. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d at 1318 n.8.  
 257. United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 258. Id. at 601. 
 259. See id. at 600–01 (describing the witnesses’ testimony). 
 260. See id. at 601 (“The defense attorney did not call Wines to testify.”). 
 261. Id. at 602 (alteration in original). 
 262. See id. at 603 (discussing defense counsel’s assertion “that if Wines had 
been called to testify, the government would have quickly asked him about his 
prior conviction of a drug-related charge”).  
 263. See id. at 606 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“I am persuaded that 
counsel’s failure to call Wines was not an objectively reasonable strategic 
decision and that Wines was prejudiced.”). 
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case,”264 he wrote. Judges Jolly and Southwick, meanwhile, 
emphasized Strickland’s “heavy burden” and wrote that “as far as 
we can determine, no defendant in any court in the United States 
has been able to prove Strickland prejudice on the basis of his 
counsel advising him not to testify in his own defense at trial.”265  
The point is that the case was close enough to require a 
tense, forty-page published opinion from a divided panel. Would 
review under a harmlessness standard have produced a different 
result? The judges would have considered the effect of the 
attorney’s deficiency in failing to call the defendant (they agreed 
on that much) without speaking of a “heavy” burden—so heavy it 
has never been satisfied. Nor would the majority have referred 
repeatedly to the “presumption” of reasonable, strategic action by 
the lawyer.266 Losing under Strickland has a momentum of its 
own. 
It is perhaps a final irony that when the Strickland Court 
chose to rely on a “materiality” standard (as with Brady 
violations) instead of a harmless-error standard,267 it did so out of 
a belief that the materiality standard was actually easier for 
                                                                                                     
 264. Id. at 620. 
 265. Id. at 606 (majority opinion). 
 266. See, e.g., id. at 603 (discussing the magistrate judge’s finding “that 
Wines had not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s decision was 
the result of sound trial strategy”). 
 267. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“[T]he 
appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of 
exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution . . . and 
in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by 
Government deportation of a witness . . . .” (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 104 (1976); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872–74 
(1982))). United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal did not apply harmless error or 
constitutional standards of review. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 
U.S. 858, 871 (1982) (“We thus conclude that the respondent can establish no 
Sixth Amendment violation without making some plausible explanation of the 
assistance he would have received from the testimony of the deported 
witnesses.”). United States v. Agurs explicitly avoided reliance on the harmless-
error standard:  
[S]ince we have rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense 
counsel, we cannot consistently treat every nondisclosure as though it 
were error. It necessarily follows that the judge should not order a 
new trial every time he is unable to characterize a nondisclosure as 
harmless under the customary harmless-error standard. 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111–12 (1976). 
WHY STRICKLAND IS THE WRONG TEST 147 
defendants to meet.268 But despite this solicitude for the fate of 
defendants, the importation of that test into the area of denial of 
the right to testify has resulted in a right without a remedy. 
One might argue that shifting from Strickland to harmless 
error will lose the competence prong of review for effective 
assistance of counsel. But this is not a problem because, as stated 
above, it is almost never within a lawyer’s authority to prevent 
the defendant from exercising his personal right to testify.269 
V. An Independent “Right to Testify,” a Proposed Test, 
and Other Considerations 
A. A Suggested Rule for Testing Claims and Ordering Hearings 
We should simply speak of an independent “right to testify,” 
an undisputed guarantee “implicit” in the Due Process, Self-
Incrimination, and Compulsory Process Clauses. It bears a 
kinship to Faretta and the autonomy cases, but mostly it is an 
application of the foremost right of all: the opportunity to be 
heard.270 Usually the accused speaks through his lawyer, but 
when a lawyer actively prevents a determined defendant from 
testifying, has that defendant really been heard? Claims about 
abridgement of the right to testify deserve a freestanding inquiry, 
decoupled from Strickland. Courts already use the harmless-error 
standard when a statute, a judge, or a prosecutor is to blame.271 
Our argument is to use this standard with defense errors, too. 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (comparing the burden on the 
defendant imposed by the materiality standard to that of other tests). 
 269. We say “almost” because there are scenarios that could prove 
exceptions to the rule. Suppose a man is on trial while under medication for 
mental illness and one day is given the wrong pills. If in a schizophrenic state he 
demands to take the stand, the lawyer might properly reject his request and 
later claim that the defendant was not acting voluntarily or was incompetent to 
make the decision.  
 270. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) (“A sentence of a court 
pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity 
to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to 
respect in any other tribunal.”). 
 271. See supra notes 99−106 and accompanying text (discussing cases in 
which a statute, a court, or a prosecutor caused error). And Rock’s balancing test 
applies in cases of conflict between a statute and the right. See Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54−56 (1987) (balancing the interest served by a state’s 
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The rule might read:  
A defendant has a right at trial to testify truthfully in his own 
defense, contrary to advice of counsel, no matter the 
evidentiary or strategic detriment, if he timely and clearly 
announces his desire to do so to his attorney. A petitioner is 
entitled to a hearing as to the abridgment of this right if he 
makes a strong showing, based on specific allegations, that his 
attorney deprived him of this right.272  
In collateral attack it is dangerously easy for a disgruntled 
convict to allege that he got bum advice;273 or that he was 
pressured into abandoning his chance to testify;274 or that some 
medical condition kept him off the stand;275 or that he should 
have been asked to waive on the record, etc.276 Before a time-
                                                                                                     
evidentiary rule with the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional 
right to testify). 
 272. We us the term “at trial” here, but one might also include other 
occasions, like crucial pre-trial proceedings. 
 273. See, e.g., United States v. Hood, No. 88-4046, 1989 WL 102017, at *1 
(9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1989) (stating that the defendant claimed his attorney 
“provided ineffective assistance by giving [the defendant] inaccurate 
information”). 
 274. See, e.g., Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(describing how the defendant’s attorney pressured the defendant into not 
testifying by threatening to withdraw mid-trial). 
 275. See, e.g., United States v. Pondelick, No. 11-30057, 2012 WL 907488, at 
*1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (noting that the defendant claimed that an abscessed 
tooth and infection kept him off the stand, even though he had stated earlier 
after “lengthy colloquy” that he did not wish to testify). 
 276. See, e.g., United States v. Aldea, 450 F. App’x 151, 152 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Aldea admitted on cross-examination, ‘[b]asically, at the end, yeah, it was my 
decision [not to testify] . . . .’”); Lott v. Attorney General of Florida, 594 F.3d 
1296, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the defendant replied “Yes, ma’am” 
when the court asked whether it was “a joint choice . . . that [he] would not 
testify in the trial); United States v. Bailey, 245 F. App’x 768, 770–71 (10th Cir. 
2007) (rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance because petitioner’s affidavit 
was “ambiguous,” and counsel submitted a “detailed” account advising Mr. 
Bailey to keep silent and listing the “numerous reasons for not wanting to 
testify,” like dangers on cross-examination). Further, despite several 
opportunities, Mr. Bailey “never once suggested to the court that he wished to 
testify.” Id. at 771; see also Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1035 (8th Cir. 
2006) (“Winfield’s claim that he did not waive his right to testify was fully 
explored at the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction proceedings, and the 
state circuit court found that penalty counsel’s testimony was credible, unlike 
that of Winfield, Kessler, and Bates.”); Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348, 357 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (“Indeed, as the magistrate noted, Petitioner did not raise this claim 
until nearly six years after his conviction, and after his appeal as of right was 
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consuming probe into uncertain credibility and faded (but self-
serving) memory is permitted—sometimes years after the events 
in question—a defendant must be required to offer a detailed, 
who-said-what account of how his right was denied.277 In rare 
circumstances the district court might require an affidavit from 
the lawyer.278 If a persuasive showing is made, an evidentiary 
hearing could find facts and assess the probable effect of the 
ungiven testimony. Although a court sometimes may violate the 
right, violations by counsel pose the special problem of 
unreviewability, since his or her acts are almost always off the 
record. Unlike other “personal” rights—to plead guilty, to defend 
pro se, to appeal, to waive jury trial—the right to testify is 
usually waived behind closed doors, without any assurance that 
the client understands his rights beyond what his lawyer tells 
him.  
Then a district court would need to make a preliminary 
inquiry under a harmless-error standard into whether it would 
have mattered. This would turn on the strength of the 
Government’s evidence, the likely significance to jurors of a 
defendant’s appearance on the stand, the centrality (or not) of the 
defendant’s ungiven testimony, the probable harms of cross-
                                                                                                     
rejected[,] . . . let alone voice any such concern at trial.”); El-Tabech v. Hopkins, 
997 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Although El-Tabech asserts that he raised 
his hand several times at trial and was admonished by the judge to address the 
court only through his attorneys, our review of the trial transcript has 
uncovered no reference to these events.”). 
 277. See Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
“particularity” is necessary to give defendant’s claim sufficient credibility to 
warrant further judicial investment); Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 
1987) (finding that no hearing was required over a claim that the defendant was 
forbidden to testify because no “specific” and “credible” allegations of compulsion 
by counsel were provided in the record). 
 278. For instance, in Chang v. United States, the court found that the 
defendant’s affidavit claiming his right to testify was not explained to him, 
although “generic,” could possibly have merited a hearing. Chang v. United 
States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). But because the district court 
supplemented the record with a “detailed affidavit from trial counsel credibly 
describing the circumstances concerning appellant’s failure to testify,” it was 
justified in dismissing the complaint without a hearing. Id. at 85. But Jiles v. 
United States considered whether a defendant should be obliged to get an 
affidavit from his lawyer. Jiles v. United States, 72 F. App’x 493, 494 (7th Cir. 
2003). The circuit held that a defendant’s “specific affidavit does not need 
corroboration from the very person accused of wrongdoing.” Id. (citing Taylor v. 
United States, 287 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
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examination and impeachment, and the jury’s presumptive view 
of the defendant’s credibility.279 If there was an erroneous 
abridgement of the right, and it might have mattered, a record 
now exists for district and circuit courts to consider alongside 
prior proceedings. 
B. The Waiver Question 
The right-to-testify waiver jurisprudence is well-settled. All 
circuits agree that defendants need not waive on the record and 
that a court is not obliged to explain the right to the defendant,280 
                                                                                                     
 279. In Ortega v. O’Leary, the panel felt that Van Arsdall, a Confrontation 
Clause case,  
sets the framework for determining whether an error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman: “[The] factors [to 
consider] include the importance of the witness’ testimony to the . . . 
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence 
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points . . . and of course, the overall strength of 
the . . . case. 
Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). 
 280. See Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States never has held that a trial court 
must engage in a personal colloquy with a defendant to determine whether he 
wishes to testify or that a waiver of the right to testify must occur formally on 
the record.”); see also Berkovitz v. Minnesota, 505 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(declining to adopt a rule requiring all defendants who do not testify to waive 
the right on the record); United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 
2007) (stating that defendant’s waiver of his right to testify does not require a 
colloquy with the court); United States v. Glenn, 389 F.3d 283, 287 (1st Cir. 
2004) (affirming that the trial court is not constitutionally required to advise the 
client of his right to testify); United States v. Manjarrez, 258 F.3d 618, 623 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the Constitution does not require a 
trial court to question a defendant sua sponte in order to ensure that his 
decision not to testify was undertaken knowingly and intelligently . . . .”); 
United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the 
majority of courts that say a “district court generally has no duty to explain to 
the defendant that he or she has a right to testify or to verify that the defendant 
who is not testifying has waived the right voluntarily”); United States v. 
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 197–98 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that a trial court 
generally has no duty to inform a defendant of his right to testify); United 
States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] trial court not only has 
no duty to make an inquiry but, as a general rule, should not inquire as to the 
defendant’s waiver of the right to testify.”); United States v. Van De Walker, 141 
F.3d 1451, 1452 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming that the appellate court is not 
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unless perhaps if he is a pro se defendant.281 This is because 
while a judge must inquire of the defendant before taking a guilty 
plea or allowing him to waive jury trial or forgo assistance of 
counsel,282 there is too great a risk in this context of impeding his 
lawyer’s strategy, interfering with the client–counsel 
relationship, leading the defendant to believe that testifying is 
being suggested, or tempting him to waive the right not to 
testify.283 A defendant may not know whether he wishes to testify 
                                                                                                     
required to inquire into defendant’s waiver of the right to testify); Brown v. 
Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) (placing “no general obligation on the trial 
court to inform a defendant of the right to testify and ascertain whether the 
defendant wishes to waive that right”); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that the trial court does not have a sua sponte 
duty to inquire whether the defendant has waived his right to testify); United 
States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the trial court has 
no duty to advise a defendant of his right to testify or to obtain an on-the-record 
waiver); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[T]here 
is no constitutional or statutory mandate that a trial court inquire further into a 
defendant’s decision not to testify . . . .”).  
But some state courts, because of the “fundamental and personal nature of 
the right,” have held that such a colloquy is necessary. Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 
73, 78 (2d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., State v. Neuman, 179 S.E.2d 77, 81–82 (W. Va. 
1988) (requiring the record to reflect a “voluntary, knowing and intelligent 
relinquishment” of the defendant’s right to testify); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 
504, 514 (Colo. 1984) (“[T]he constitutional right to testify is so fundamental 
that procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that the defendant 
understands the significance of waiver of this right.”); Culberson v. State, 412 
So.2d 1184, 1186–87 (Miss. 1982) (suggesting to trial judges of the state to 
advise a defendant of his right to testify and to make a record of his waiver); see 
also Timothy P. O’Neill, Vindicating the Defendant’s Constitutional Right to 
Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 809, 810 (1990) (arguing that defense attorney should put defendant’s 
waiver of the right to testify on the record in the judge’s presence). 
 281. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 
2011) 
[T]he district court was required to correct Ly’s misunderstanding of 
his right to testify. By not informing Ly that he could testify in 
narrative form, the district court denied his right to choose whether 
to testify “knowingly and intelligently.” This case falls within one of 
the “exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances” that trigger a 
district court’s duty to discuss with a criminal defendant his decision 
of whether to testify. 
 282. See United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1070–71 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(citing Supreme Court cases that require this inquiry). 
 283. See United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that waiver of the right to testify “qualitatively differs” from the 
right to enter a plea of guilty, waive a jury trial, or forego the assistance of 
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until he hears the State’s evidence; the court will not know until 
the defense rests.284 Waiving at trial is unlike waiving at a plea 
hearing, for a plea is “itself a conviction.”285 A colloquy is probably 
necessary only when counsel or defendant tips off a court that a 
dispute between them over testifying has arisen.286 A colloquy 
then helps to prove waiver later on.287 If a colloquy occurs, 
however, caution is necessary so that the court explains to the 
defendant that he possesses the right without venturing into 
comment on advisability.288  
                                                                                                     
counsel); United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 11 (3d Cir. 1995) (reasoning 
that it is “inadvisable for a court to question a defendant directly about his or 
her waiver of the right to testify”). In United States v. Joelson, the trial judge, 
apprised of the defendant’s desire to testify, told him directly: “There’s such a 
thing as crucifying yourself when you take the stand and testify. So once again, 
I can only say to you that your lawyer is an experienced lawyer and you ought to 
follow his advice.” United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 176–77 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Despite finding this “troubling” and “inadvisable,” the court of appeals 
concluded that the advice “was not so egregious that Joelson’s ability to 
knowingly and intentionally waive his right to testify was impaired.” Id. at 178. 
 284. And at this point, of course, a desire to testify would come too late. See 
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d at 11 (stating that “a colloquy on the right to testify” when 
the defense rests “not only would be awkward . . . but more importantly 
inadvertently might cause the defendant to think that the court believes the 
defense has been insufficient” (citation omitted)). 
 285. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
 286. See Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(involving such interruptions); Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 
1988) (same). The Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction seems stocked with unruly 
defendants. 
 287. See United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that despite the defendant’s claim that his trial counsel would not allow 
him to take the stand, the defendant “bypassed an opportunity to support such a 
claim in the district court”). The court noted that “[n]othing in the record 
supports the assertion that counsel thwarted [the defendant’s] desire to testify,” 
and “[t]o the contrary, the district judge asked [the defendant] during the trial 
whether he wanted to testify.” Id. 
 288. See, e.g., United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (“Experience demonstrates that district courts sometimes provide 
inappropriate commentary when they inject themselves into a defendant’s 
choice of whether to testify.”); United States v. Yono, 605 F.3d 425, 426 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (advising against a colloquy into the defendant’s waiver of his 
right to testify); United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(stating that a trial court should avoid encouraging or discouraging a 
defendant to testify); United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 13 (3d Cir. 
1995) (noting that sometimes a trial court might have to “inquire discreetly” 
to ensure that a defendant’s constitutional rights are not suppressed); 
Joelson, 7 F.3d at 178 (discussing the danger of “judicial interference 
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The waiver inquiry tests whether the defendant made a 
knowing, intelligent relinquishment.289 In nearly every case in 
which a defendant does not testify or inform the court of a desire 
to do so, waiver should be presumed or inferred.290 Defense 
counsel would always have primary responsibility for advising 
the defendant on the right and the implications of exercising it.291 
A good test must catch instances in which a defendant is stripped 
of his right without adding new layers to the already extensive 
protections for criminal defendants.  
                                                                                                     
with this strategic decision”); United States v. Goodwin, 770 F.2d 631, 635–38 
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that “[t]he trial judge . . . went beyond his limited 
function of ensuring that Goodwin’s decision not to testify was voluntary when 
he expressed surprise . . . , explained some of the pros and cons of her taking the 
stand, and strongly implied that her only chance for acquittal was to testify”); 
Arthur v. United States, 986 A.2d 398, 407 (D.C. 2009) (stating that a trial 
judge has “responsibility to ensure that the weight of judicial authority does not 
unduly influence” the defendant’s exercise of his right to testify). See also 
United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
trial court need not inquire into waiver, and that even if a court does inquire, it 
has no duty to ensure that waiver was knowing and voluntary). Such a rule 
“would actually disfavor criminal defendants by tending to discourage judges 
from conducting any inquiry at all of a silent defendant.” Id. 
 289. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“Like other fundamental trial rights, the right to testify is truly protected 
only when the defendant makes his decision knowingly and intelligently.”); 
United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) (“If a defendant does 
waive this right [to testify], the waiver must be knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent.”). 
 290. See United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Thus, 
waiver of the right to testify may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and 
is presumed from the defendant’s failure to testify or notify the court of his 
desire to do so.”). Because the question arises in every trial, and is generally 
decided between client and counsel without inquiry, federal courts really have 
no choice but to make this presumption. See Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 
639 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that although the right to testify is a fundamental 
right subject only to knowing and intelligent waiver, “‘waiver of certain 
fundamental rights can be presumed from a defendant’s conduct alone, absent 
circumstances giving rise to a contrary inference’” (quoting United States v. 
Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 2007))). 
 291. See Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d at 1313 (“In cases where a defendant is 
represented by counsel, counsel is responsible for providing the advice needed to 
render the defendant’s decision of whether to testify knowing and intelligent.”); 
United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Thus, defense 
counsel, not the court, has the primary responsibility for advising the defendant 
of his right to testify and for explaining the tactical implications of doing so or 
not.”). 
154 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95 (2013) 
The right to testify remains circumscribed by other 
legitimate trial interests and rules of evidence or procedure.292 
These operate to disallow testimony on subjects ruled 
inadmissible after in limine motions,293 to prevent false 
testimony,294 to prohibit unreliable forms of evidence,295 to 
maintain fair, orderly proceedings,296 to ensure that any 
testimony is given after oath or affirmation,297 to keep an unruly 
defendant from degrading the trial,298 or perhaps to inhibit a 
mentally defective defendant from sinking himself on the 
stand.299 A defendant may not claim that his right to testify is 
                                                                                                     
 292. See United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1983) (agreeing 
with the district court that although defendant wanted to testify about duress, 
such testimony was inadmissible because irrelevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402). 
 293. See United States v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 709 (2012) 
(considering the rights of a defendant seeking to testify on matters specifically 
excluded by the ruling of the trial court). 
 294. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173–74 (1986) (stating there is “no 
permissible choice to testify falsely”). 
 295. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987) (“In applying its 
evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule 
justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to 
testify.”). Arkansas could not, without better evidence, ban entirely a 
defendant’s use of hypnotically refreshed memory. See id. at 61. 
 296. See United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 59–60 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing 
a court to exercise discretion, in the interests of fairness and order, to refuse to 
reopen evidence for testimony when defendant asserted his right to testify only 
after the evidence-taking stage of the trial was closed, though before it was sent 
to the jury). A court might find that the defendant is trying to engage in delay or 
other improper purpose.  
 297. See United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th Cir. 1969) 
(disallowing a defendant who was a conscientious objector from testifying 
because of a religious inability to swear on the Bible and raise his hand). The 
circuit remanded for a new trial, instructing that “all the district judge need do 
is to make inquiry as to what form of oath or affirmation would not offend 
defendant’s religious beliefs but would give rise to a duty to speak the truth.” Id. 
at 1407. 
 298. See United States v. Bentvana, 319 F.2d 916, 944 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(discussing the misbehaving defendant’s right to testify). The defendant had 
engaged in “outbursts and serious misconduct” and the judge was bound to 
“maintain the order and decorum necessary for a fair trial.” Id. But the circuit 
nonetheless found that the court should have allowed the testimony “[i]n view of 
the importance of the privilege” and instead have had a marshal subdue or gag 
him if he continued to insist on disobeying court orders. Id. 
 299. See People v. Robles, 466 P.2d. 710, 716 n.1 (Cal. 1970) (“In some 
situations a defendant’s persistence in testifying contrary to his attorney’s 
advice might raise questions as to the defendant’s present sanity.”); see also 
WHY STRICKLAND IS THE WRONG TEST 155 
tread upon by rules allowing cross-examination or impeachment 
with prior convictions and bad acts.300 The Supreme Court has 
also held that obstruction of justice enhancements are no burden 
on the right.301 An accused who testifies is in the position of any 
other witness: duty-bound to speak truthfully, entitled to the 
same privileges, and exposed to the same perils of impeachment, 
stress, embarrassment, and so on.  
It is well-established that the right to testify may be waived 
only by the defendant.302 According to Chief Judge Frank 
                                                                                                     
Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2003) 
Ward’s counsel admitted that it wasn’t his client, but he who had 
made the decision to keep Ward off the stand. He further told the 
court that he didn’t believe he could have an informed discussion with 
Ward about the decision, since most of his prior exchanges with his 
client were one-sided, generating only an occasional ‘uh-uh’ response 
from Ward. 
 300. See United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing how an apparently unstable defendant took the stand, to her 
detriment, over counsel’s strenuous urging). On appeal, Ms. Siddiqui’s lawyer 
argued that “in some cases a defendant may be competent to stand trial yet 
incompetent to exercise her right to testify without the approval of defense 
counsel.” Id. at 705. The court declined to decide this question. Id. at 705–06. 
The case is also a fine example of the lengths to which a zealous defense lawyer 
and a concerned judge can go to help a defendant avoid self-inflicted wounds, 
short of compulsion. See id. at 698 n.4 (discussing the lengths to which they 
went). See also People v. Robles, 466 P.2d. 710, 716 n.1 (Cal. 1970) (“In some 
situations a defendant’s persistence in testifying contrary to his attorney’s 
advice might raise questions as to the defendant’s present sanity.”); Ward v. 
Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2003) 
Ward’s counsel admitted that it wasn’t his client, but he who had 
made the decision to keep Ward off the stand. He further told the 
court that he didn’t believe he could have an informed discussion with 
Ward about the decision, since most of his prior exchanges with his 
client were one-sided, generating only an occasional ‘uh-uh’ response 
from Ward. 
 301. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that courts will enhance sentences whenever the accused 
takes the stand and is found guilty). 
 302. See United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling 
that only the defendant may waive the right to testify in his own defense (citing 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987))). Dozens of cases confirm this proposition. 
See, e.g., Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 1989) (providing an 
early post-Strickland, post-Rock statement of this rule of law). Teague 
acknowledged that the “right is personal to the defendant and cannot be waived 
either by the trial court or by defense counsel . . . . [T]here can be no effective 
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right unless there is an ‘intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right of privilege.’” United States v. 
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Easterbrook, the distinction between this and the ordinary rights 
of trial management (whether to call a witness, object to hearsay, 
etc.), is that the former are choices in which “one does not need a 
legal education to appreciate the issues.”303  
The presumption against the waiver of constitutional 
rights304 is why a judge who accepts a plea must ensure that the 
defendant grasps what he is waiving.305 Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 requires a court to inquire about the defendant’s 
awareness of his rights to plead not guilty, have a jury trial, and 
secure counsel.306 Another provision of Rule 11 directs the court 
to inform the defendant of his “right at trial to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-
incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the 
attendance of witnesses.”307 Each of the rights just listed appears 
in Madison’s Bill of Rights—except the “right to testify.” Yet 
today a plea is invalid unless the court ensures waiver of the 
right “personally in open court.”308  
Finally, any rule requiring a defendant to gainsay his 
attorney in front of a judge to avoid an inference of waiver seems 
unfair; if anyone, it is the lawyer’s job to expose disagreement.309 
                                                                                                     
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532−33 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 
 303. Babul, 476 F.3d at 500. 
 304. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (“A strict 
standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal 
defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible opportunity to 
utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial.”); Glasser 
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1942) (stating that the court must “indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights” but 
must also protect those rights by ensuring that the waiver is “intelligent” and 
“competent”); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1966) (“When 
constitutional rights turn on the resolution of a factual dispute we are duty 
bound to make an independent examination of the evidence in the record.”).  
 305. At the same time, there can really be no presumption against waiver of 
the right to testify without presuming an intent to abandon the right to remain 
silent. No presumptions should apply to this choice between silence and speech. 
 306. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(D). 
 307. Id. 11(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). The right to testify is recognized 
elsewhere in the rules. See, e.g., id. 12.3(c) (stating that a public-authority 
defense can be barred under certain circumstances but that this “does not limit 
the defendant’s right to testify”).  
 308. Id. 11(b)(2). 
 309. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 760–61 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that a defendant may not waive his right to testify under his lawyer’s 
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Instances in which a defendant does pipe up seem to involve 
uncommonly self-assured men, like the one who shouted of his 
lawyer—“He lies. Lies. Lies.”—until the court threatened to 
remove him.310 From the case law it also appears that a trial 
judge is likelier to regard such efforts as irksome impertinence 
rather than an alarm that a right is going unheeded.311 
C. Due Process Clause Inquiry? 
The Due Process Clause generally applies to violations 
committed by the state, not a lawyer.312 One might argue that 
because the State brings the case (prosecutor), conducts the trial 
                                                                                                     
advice and then try to invalidate the trial because he decided to abide by his 
lawyer’s counsel), vacated, 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991); see also United States 
v. McMeans, 927 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that waiver was 
appropriate partly because the defendant’s testimony at an earlier trial evinced 
knowledge of the right to testify); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 
751–52 (8th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that the defendant did not object when his 
counsel rested without calling him to the stand). But see Chang v. United 
States, 250 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing the inconsistency of requiring 
a defendant to rely on his attorney to speak for him in the courtroom and 
holding that by failing to speak the defendant has waived his right to testify); 
United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing that it is 
impracticable to put a burden on the defendant who might not even be aware of 
the right he possesses and that the burden would conflict with the instruction 
that a defendant should speak through his counsel); Underwood v. Clark, 939 
F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing to treat a defendant’s silence as a waiver 
of the right to testify because the defendant might feel “too intimidated to speak 
out of turn in this fashion”); United States v. Teague, 908 F.2d 752, 759–60 
(11th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find “that by failing to speak out at the proper time 
a defendant has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of a personal 
right of fundamental importance such as the right to testify”), vacated, 932 F.2d 
899 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 310. See Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1157–64 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(containing a tense exchange); see also United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 
254 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) (“How could he make such a request? 
Leggett could not very well have disrupted the proceedings by standing in open 
court and speaking directly to the judge without being asked anything.”). 
 311. See, e.g., Leggett, 162 F.3d at 254 (noting that the judge “feared” that 
Leggett might “jump to his feet and assert his right to testify”). 
 312. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998) 
(describing the Due Process Clause as limiting what the government may do); 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905) (stating that under the Due 
Process Clause “no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law”). 
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(judge), and executes the sentence (warden), failure to ensure a 
trial in which a defendant’s right to testify is respected is state 
action. This is the theory behind why certain attorney conduct—
like failing to disclose a material conflict of interest—still 
implicates state action.313 But again, a stand-alone “right to 
testify” inquiry is needed.314 
VI. Conclusion 
Taking the long view, the constitutional right to testify is a 
novelty. Over three centuries, what was prohibited to a defendant 
became a statutory privilege, then a sort of assumed right, and 
finally an explicit constitutional command.315 In federal courts it 
took a century for the statutory privilege (1878)316 to harden into 
constitutional right (1987).317 During the 1960s and ’70s it was 
                                                                                                     
 313. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (“This Court’s decisions 
establish that a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated and conducted by the 
State itself, is an action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 314. Under the Sixth Amendment’s “presumed prejudice” line, courts decline 
to scour the record to ascertain the degree of prejudice. These are cases where, 
for instance, a lawyer carelessly forfeited an appeal. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (“The even more serious denial of the entire judicial 
proceeding itself . . . similarly demands a presumption of prejudice.”). Or where 
a lawyer failed to comply with Anders and left his client uncounseled on appeal. 
See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88–89 (1988) (“It is therefore inappropriate to 
apply either the prejudice requirement of Strickland or the harmless-error 
analysis of Chapman.”). Presumed prejudice is a form of structural error: both 
involve mistakes that foreclosed an avenue, disabled the creation of a record, or 
raised barriers to determining what might have happened. We feel prejudice 
should not be presumed for the same reasons the error here is not structural. 
Every circuit has rejected the claim, occasionally made, for presumed prejudice. 
See, e.g., Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (determining 
there is no presumption of prejudice for right-to-testify cases). 
 315. Few would argue that if competency statutes in the states and U.S. 
Code were repealed, courts of this country would once again be permitted to 
deny defendants the power to choose to testify. It might also be remembered 
that both the right to testify and the common law rule against defendant 
testimony were alike intended to bring out the truth and protect the defendant 
(which, as noted, was once thought best done by prohibiting all defendants from 
testifying, so that no harmful inferences for failure to speak would be made by 
the jury). 
 316. See 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2006) (federal competency statute first enacted in 
1878). 
 317. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (“The right to testify on 
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still treated as a trial tactic.318 But when finally 
constitutionalized it became necessary for courts to decide how to 
review alleged infringements. Because it seemed like a matter of 
lawyer ineffectiveness, the U.S. courts of appeals, in the 1990s, 
reached for the familiar Strickland standard. The problem, we 
see, is that Strickland frustrates the right. Rarely will an 
overbearing attorney’s conduct provoke a postconviction inquiry; 
almost never will it lead to a new result. The court is usually 
satisfied to concede a violation of right while squinting in vain to 
find prejudice. And no wonder: the lawyer is almost always right 
to restrain his client. Yet the proper avenue is not Strickland but 
an independent, constitutional inquiry. The first court to do so 
gets to name it.` 
  
                                                                                                     
one’s own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the 
Constitution.”) 
 318. See United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1009 (10th Cir. 1971) 
(“[T]he decision of counsel to place or not to place his client on the stand has 
been described as particularly difficult, and has generally been treated as a 
question of trial tactics.”); see also United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 
(2d Cir. 1963) (expressing the statement of old view, before Rock and Strickland, 
that denial of right to testify is strategic and there is no remedy for strategic 
error); Seth Dawson, Due Process v. Defense Counsel’s Unilateral Waiver of the 
Defendant’s Right to Testify, 3 HASTINGS L.Q. 517, 523 (1975) (“There is a 
growing recognition that the right to testify has transcended its statutory 
origins and is now emerging as a constitutionally protected right, inherent in 
the ever-broadening concept of due process.”). In 1993, the Ninth Circuit said it 
“essentially is a strategic trial decision with constitutional implications.” United 
States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 178 (9th Cir. 1993). 
